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RISKY LONG-TERM PROJECTS 
 
OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide theoretical insight into the procurement 
of a nuclear power plant. Previous experience has shown that contracting for a 
risky long-term project is likely to involve unforeseen contingencies that cannot 
be contractually accounted for. Moreover, the long project duration highlights 
the discrepancies induced by informational asymmetry between the contracting 
parties.   
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
The theoretical framework for static contracting consists of basic bidding and 
contracting models. The bidding phase incorporates adverse selection issues; the 
contracting phase is linked to moral hazard issues. 
The theoretical framework for dynamic contracting builds on the static theory, 
accounting for long project duration and the heightened risk. Adding dynamics 
to the setting creates the risk of underinvestment, and yields more complicated 
results. 
KEY FINDINGS 
Simple procurement can be governed by conventional tools: optimal bidding 
arrangements and monitoring suffice to mitigate adverse selection and moral 
hazard in the static setting. In contrast, a dynamic long-term procurement setting 
involves risk of both underinvestment and renegotiations. In order to achieve the 
optimal outcome, the incentives of the contracting parties must be aligned. 
Output-dependent ex-post compensation is best organized through an option 
contract or vertical ownership arrangements. 
KEYWORDS 
Contract theory; procurement contracting; asymmetric information; adverse 
selection; moral hazard; nuclear power industry; power industry; holdup; 
contractual incompleteness; renegotiation. 
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KUINKA YDINVOIMALA OSTETAAN? HANKINTASOPIMUKSET KORKEARISKISISSÄ 
JA PITKÄKESTOISISSA PROJEKTEISSA 
 
TAVOITTEET 
 Tämän tutkielman tarkoitus on tuoda teoreettinen näkökulma ydinvoimalan 
 hankintasopimuksen valmisteluun. Aiempi kokemus on osoittanut, että 
 pitkäkestoinen korkeariskinen sopimus todennäköisesti sisältää odottamattomia 
 elementtejä, joita ei kyetä  sopimuksellisesti kattamaan. Tämän lisäksi projektin 
 pitkä kesto korostaa epäsymmetrisen informaation aiheuttamaa epäsuhtaa 
 sopimusosapuolten välillä. 
TEOREETTINEN VIITEKEHYS  
Teoreettisen viitekehyksen staattinen osa kattaa tarjousvaiheen ja 
sopimusvaiheen. Tarjousvaiheessa käsitellään haitallista valikoitumista ja 
sopimusvaiheessa moraalikatoa.   
Teoreettisen viitekehyksen dynaaminen osa pohjautuu staattiseen 
viitekehykseen lisäten siihen projektin pitkän keston ja kohonneen riskisyyden. 
Dynamiisuuden lisääminen sopimusmalliin saattaa johtaa optimitasoa 
pienempiin investointeihin sekä staattista mallia monimutkaisempiin 
johtopäätöksiin.  
TULOKSET 
Yksinkertaisia hankintasopimuksia pystytään hallinnoimaan tavanmukaisin 
välinein: tarjousvaiheen järjestelyjen huolellinen valmistelu sekä monitorointi 
riittävät eliminoimaan haitallisen valikoitumisen ja moraalikadon riskin 
staattisessa mallissa. Sitä vastoin dynaaminen malli käsittää sekä optimitason 
alhaisemman investoinnin että uudelleenneuvottelujen riskin. Parhaan 
mahdollisen lopputuloksen saavuttamiseksi sopimusosapuolten kannustimien 
tulee olla yhdensuuntaiset. Lopputulokseen sidottu korvaus toteutetaan 
optiosopimuksen tai omistusjärjestelyjen avulla. 
ASIASANAT 
Sopimusteoria, hankintasopimukset, epäsymmetrinen informaatio, haitallinen 
valikoituminen, moraalikato, ydinvoima-ala, energia-ala, epätäydellinen 
sopimus; uudelleenneuvottelu 
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1   Introduction 
Nuclear power has been the subject of rising interest due to the greenhouse gas emission reduction 
targets and increasing fossil fuel prices since the beginning of the new millennium. There was a 
long halt in new nuclear construction projects in the 1990s in the aftermath of the Chernobyl 
nuclear disaster. According to the World Nuclear Association (2011) the increasing electricity 
demand and the need for sustainable energy have lately induced several new nuclear construction 
projects, especially in developing countries but also in Europe. The increasing European demand 
for new nuclear reactors stems also from the fact that a number of first generation reactors are 
shortly coming to the end of their life cycle, and their generation capacity needs to be replaced. In 
Western Europe, Finland and France are currently constructing new reactors, and the United 
Kingdom is in an advanced phase of planning. In Central and Eastern Europe, Poland, Estonia and 
Latvia are working on a joint nuclear program. There are opposing signs, too: the Fukushima 
nuclear disaster induced Germany to announce a gradual shutdown of its nuclear reactors by 2020.      
The so-called nuclear renaissance has been off to a bumpy start. Current European nuclear projects 
provide two examples. First, the infamous Olkiluoto 3 project in Western Finland sets an interesting 
benchmark in a negative sense. The client, Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO), ordered the nuclear 
power plant from the French nuclear power plant supplier Areva as a fixed-price turn-key contract. 
The fixed-price contract was intended to fully transfer the design-related risks of the first-of-a-kind 
project to the supplier. The supplier, Areva, was willing to accept the extensive scope as Olkiluoto 3 
was intended to become a showcase of the company's new technology at the dawn of the nuclear 
renaissance. However, the project has faced costly delays that have so far nearly doubled both the 
budget and the schedule. The main issues seem to stem from the inflexible contract structure: the 
fixed-price contract is very rigid when changes are required, and falls short in providing time-
related incentives. Moreover, Areva's inexperience from the role of an architect engineer in projects 
of extensive scope has led to coordination problems. The delays and cost overruns have induced 
bitter feuds between TVO and Areva, who have entered into an extensive litigation process of 
claims and counterclaims that are being settled by the International Chamber of Commerce. 
Currently the value of claims on both sides is estimated to a total of 2−3 billion euros. As a second 
example, the French Flamanville 3 project has been facing similar issues concerning quality 
management and subcontractor chain, which have led to costly delays more than doubling the 
budget and the schedule for the project. (Nuclear Engineering International, 2009; World Nuclear 
Association, 2011)  
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The abovementioned recent examples of procurement contracting demonstrate that further insight 
into nuclear power plant procurement is needed. In particular, the increasing importance of nuclear 
energy in the Finnish electricity market and the recent challenges in nuclear projects further 
emphasize this need. The market characteristics that distinguish the nuclear power plant industry 
from other procurement settings require careful consideration. There is little empirical research on 
procurement contracting in the particular field, since the number of projects is fairly limited and the 
information available is scarce. Moreover, contracts are drafted under strictly enforced non-
disclosure agreements, which renders gathering of empirical data nearly impossible. Generic 
procurement literature that explores standard procurement processes such as highways (Bajari & 
Lewis, 2009), standard power plants (Lewis, 1986) or on a more limited scale repeated contracting 
e.g. coal provision, is reviewed in chapter 2. In contrast, this section addresses the market features 
and the regulatory environment that distinguish the nuclear power plant market from other 
industries. Compared to a generic procurement setting, the nuclear power plant market encompasses 
the following distinctive features: 
1. Bilateral oligopoly. Despite the recent boom in nuclear building, the market still consists 
of few potential suppliers and few potential buyers. In such a setting, the exit of a supplier 
from the market or the entry of a new client can quickly deteriorate the client's negotiation 
position. The bilateral oligopoly is supported by the inability of a standard electricity utility 
to take the construction of a nuclear power plant in-house due to the high degree of specific 
design requirements. Therefore a nuclear energy company willing to take on nuclear power 
generation is forced to trade with one of the few existing reactor suppliers. 
2. Risk. A nuclear power plant differs from other large-scale construction projects in that the 
project is of very little value before 100% completed. However, both the supplier and the 
buyer become locked into each other in a very early stage of the project, with an 
insignificant default option. The risk during this relationship accrues from the following 
factors, and has to been contractually divided between the contracting parties. 
a. Immature design. There are usually only a few units built of each reactor model 
before the next generation design takes over. Moreover, each power plant needs to 
be customized to meet the regulatory requirements and the particular client's needs. 
The immature design also leads to a heightened yet unknown risk profile. 
b. Long-term commitment. Even the most hurried nuclear power plant projects have 
taken 48 months from the first concrete pouring to the beginning of commercial 
operation − the preceding negotiation and licensing phases included the timeframe 
 3 
 
is likely to be twice as long. Costs are incurred throughout the process, whereas the 
benefits accrue only after the project is completed. Moreover, post-construction 
liability is likely to lengthen the duration of the supplier-client relationship even 
further.  
c. High degree of regulation. The industry is highly regulated both internationally 
and domestically. As follows, the information flow between the regulator, the client 
and the supplier needs to be seamless. Moreover, the high degree of regulation 
brings along a notable risk of changes in design requirements, thus increasing the 
overall project riskiness. The riskiness of the project is further enhanced by the 
reform of the Finnish nuclear law that is expected to come into effect in 2013. 
 
Some of the abovementioned features are also identified within defense procurement literature. 
Rogerson (1994) explores massive uncertainties in defense procurement, dividing them into internal 
and external threats. Internal threats involve problems in the design and production, whereas 
external threats focus on changes in the environment, e.g. legislation and external financing. These 
threats are parallel to the immaturity of design and the high degree of regulation. However, 
examples from defense procurement tend towards repeated long-term commitment (e.g. Rogerson, 
1994; Hiller & Tollison, 1978) instead of extensive one-time project investments. These differences 
alongside with the industry-specific features indicate a research gap in the existing procurement 
literature. 
1.1  Research questions 
The research questions of this thesis concern the optimal contracting for a risky long-term project 
where asymmetric information is present. In addressing these issues, the thesis employs the 
classical principal–agent paradigm as presented within contract theory. In the sense of a Stackelberg 
game (Salanié, 2005, p.5) principal is the contracting party who proposes a contract and agent is the 
follower who accepts or rejects the contract. For example, Sappington (1984) determines this 
relationship such that the principal owns a productive technology that requires as an input the effort 
of the agent. In the context of nuclear reactor procurement, the client or the nuclear power facility is 
referred to as principal whereas the supplier or the contractor is referred to as agent. 
As in all contract theory, the assumption of asymmetric information is strongly present throughout 
the thesis. Asymmetric information refers to the realistic assumption that the principal and the agent 
are unlikely to share the same information about their cost structure and about the future states of 
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world. This leads to discrepancies in both bidding phase and contracting phase – by leveraging on 
informational asymmetry either party might be capable of reaping most surplus from the bilateral 
contract. Informational asymmetry occurs both ex ante – before the state of the world that affects 
the outcome of the contract has been realized – and ex post − after the state of the world has 
become known to both parties. It is commonly acknowledged within contract theory that the 
problems of asymmetric information lead to deviations from the pareto–optimal outcome of a 
contract (e.g. Baron & Besanko, 1987). These effects and their mitigation are explored with the 
following research questions: 
1. What are the optimal bidding arrangements? 
2. What is the optimal contract structure? 
3. How to ensure the optimal outcome in case of renegotiation? 
 
The first question is posed for theoretical interest and in order to provide a comprehensive 
contracting timeline. The theoretical insight provides support to the intuitive results about how an 
extensive procurement bidding process is optimally arranged. The second research question raises 
the issue of optimal contract structure. A contract is said to be optimal, when the contracting parties 
are induced to choose their investment levels so that the joint marginal cost equals the joint 
marginal benefit. The optimal investment levels are referred to as ex-ante efficiency. However, a 
contracting environment encompasses large uncertainties, which can distort the ex-post efficiency 
of the contract. The third research question embraces this idea of ex-post inefficiencies and 
acknowledges that judicially every contract can be renegotiated – or breached. A contracting party 
should seek to ensure that trade takes place in all circumstances in which it creates value to him. 
This thesis provides insight into the contracting tools with which the optimal outcome can be 
achieved. 
1.2  Theoretical framework 
Within contract theory, a well-established approach is to divide the contracting process into two 
phases: bidding and contracting. Informational asymmetry is present in both as follows. In the 
bidding phase informational asymmetry allows for agent's hidden information which can induce 
adverse selection. In the contracting phase, informational asymmetry allows for hidden action, 
which can induce moral hazard. Contractual incompleteness is closely related to asymmetric 
information – not even the most extensive contract can account for every possible future 
contingency. In complex or uncertain environments, the contracting parties are likely to renegotiate 
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the contract at some point. Therefore, this thesis discusses renegotiation as the third phase of a 
procurement project.  
The following figure conceptualizes the theoretical framework of the thesis (Figure 1: Theoretical 
framework: Contractual issues). A procurement process is divided into three phases: bidding, 
contracting and renegotiation. The dominating environmental characteristic throughout the 
contracting period is asymmetric information. Moreover, contractual incompleteness is a major 
factor allowing for moral hazard and holdups in both contracting and renegotiation phase. The main 
problems associated with procurement contracting are adverse selection, moral hazard and holdup 
situations. This thesis discusses theoretical solutions to each of these issues and provides practical 
insight into how procurement should be conducted in order to ensure an optimal outcome. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
1.3  Related literature 
The scope of the literature reviewed in this thesis covers the initial contracting scheme with 
competing suppliers, the actual contractual negotiations and holdup situations leading to 
renegotiation. The contract theory literature originates from the 1960s and 1970s when the theory of 
incentives was first explored, and the concepts of private information and hidden action were 
introduced.  Most literature reviewed in this thesis stems from research from the late 1970s and the 
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early 1980s emphasizing the optimal incentives in static contracts. There is a reasonable 
understanding about the theoretical framework for the static setting, where environmental 
characteristics remain stable or have little impact on the outcome of a contract. The second wave in 
the late 1980s and around 1990s, in turn, shifts focus towards long-term dynamic contracting. 
Renegotiation and contractual incompleteness are in the center of attention. After 2000, the theory 
about dynamic contracting in complex environments has been developed further. However, a clear 
consensus about the theoretical framework still remains to be reached. (Bolton & Dewatripont, 
2004) 
This thesis explores both elementary contract theory and more specific contracting examples. 
Whereas the empirical examples and the most relevant industry cases are based on individual 
articles, the overview of contract theory and the theoretical definitions used in this thesis are largely 
based on two manuals. The first is Contract Theory by Bolton and Dewatripont (2004) and the 
second is The Economics of Contracts by Salanié (2005). Law & Economics (Cooter and Ulen, 
2004) has also been a source of inspiration. 
When assessing the literature one has to carefully bear in mind the fact that the majority of 
procurement projects concern standardized procurement and mass production. This sets limitations 
to the extent to which the theory can be applied to the nuclear power plant industry, where every 
project is a tailor-made modification of a relatively young design that might get repeated only a 
dozen times over its lifetime, and where risk is highly present. The market features of nuclear power 
industry are considered throughout the thesis to assess which aspects of the literature are relevant in 
this study.  
1.4  Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured according to the theoretical framework as follows. Chapter 2 presents the 
case company Fennovoima, and the procurement project at hand. A contracting timeline and 
assumptions on the risk preferences of the contracting parties are presented. Furthermore, chapter 2 
briefly discusses parallels between the procurement project at hand and other fields of industry. 
Chapters 3–6 present contract theory according to the timeline presented above so that chapters 3 
and 4 focus on the static setting, whereas dynamics are introduced into the setting in chapters 5 and 
6. In particular, chapter 3 explores the bidding phase, where competition between the bidders is a 
predominant feature. The first section presents a simple model of adverse selection. Different 
mechanisms to choose the supplier are introduced in the second section. The final section presents 
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general remarks concerning the bidding phase. Chapter 4 explores the contracting phase that takes 
place after the preferred bidder has been selected. The first section presents a simple model of moral 
hazard. The optimal risk-sharing structure is discussed in the second section. The third section 
presents incentives for achieving quality, and the final section makes general remarks about the 
contracting phase. As for chapter 5, the focus lies on holdup situations. The first section presents the 
underlying theory and the second section discusses some contractual solutions to the topic. The 
final section of chapter 5 presents general remarks about holdup situations. Finally, chapter 6 
reviews renegotiation. The first section discusses the underlying theory. Incomplete contracts are 
described in the second section. The third section presents a few topics in renegotiation literature, 
and the final section sums up the topic by presenting some general remarks. The findings and 
practical implications vis-à-vis the case company are discussed in chapter 7. The discussion is 
completed by noting the limitations of the study and pointing out topics for further research.  
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2  Procurement project in the case company 
Fennovoima Ltd. is the newest entrant in the Finnish nuclear power industry. The company was 
founded in 2007 by Voimaosakeyhtiö SF (66%), a consortium of Finnish electricity and industrial 
companies, and the German electricity company E.ON (34%) with the aim of constructing a new 
nuclear plant that could be operational in 2020. After being granted the decision-in-principle, 
Fennovoima has proceeded with the project to build a nuclear power plant in North-Western 
Finland, in the Pyhäjoki municipality. The company sent out a bid invitation specification to two 
potential reactor suppliers in 2011 after narrowing the choice down from a few major reactor 
builders. The negotiations with the potential bidders, the French Areva and the Japanese Toshiba, 
will be held in parallel until the selection of preferred bidder is made. The financial closing is 
planned for 2015, when the company is expected to be issued the actual construction license. 
(Fennovoima Project Schedule) 
A quarter of Finland's electricity supply is produced by nuclear power. In 2012, there are four 
reactors in operation, two run by TVO in Olkiluoto and two run by Fortum Plc in Loviisa. TVO is 
currently constructing a third reactor. TVO and Fennovoima were granted decisions-in-principle by 
the Finnish Parliament in 2010, which permits the two companies to proceed with the planning of 
two new nuclear reactors. These projects completed, there will be seven nuclear reactors in Finland, 
generating up to 50% of the country's electricity supply. (World Nuclear Association, 2012) 
In 2012, Fennovoima is negotiating for a contract for the procurement of a nuclear reactor for its 
first nuclear power plant, Hanhikivi 1. This thesis explores contract theory within this framework. 
The following three issues are of particular concern. First, the reactor supplier has superior 
information about his ability, which can affect the ex-post welfare of the contracting parties. 
Asymmetric information between Fennovoima and the prospective reactor supplier is abundant, 
which further contributes to the riskiness of the project from the company's point of view. 
Informational advantage about their cost structure can account for disproportioned bargaining 
leverage to the agent in the bidding phase, the contracting phase and the plausible renegotiation 
phase, and thus allow for the agent to reap most of the surplus generated by the bilateral contract. 
Second, the project involves massive uncertainties, and the related risk needs to be borne by either 
one or both contracting parties. Risk is highly typical to the nuclear construction projects: nuclear 
power plant projects are lengthy, the design is likely to change during the project, and the regulatory 
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environment is prone to changes. A contractual failure can lead to costly delays, which in turn can 
affect negatively the public opinion and the regulatory environment, and thus increase the riskiness 
of the Fennovoima project and reduce the probability of a positive outcome. Third, the project 
involves large relationship-specific investments, as a significant part of the design development 
work that has to be conducted in the early stages of this project may not be applicable in other 
projects or with another supplier. This might lead to socially suboptimal investment levels.  
In addition to the general challenges listed above, the Fennovoima project involves project-specific 
challenges. Considering the Finnish nuclear regulation practices and the extensive regulatory lags, 
the project is a unique possibility for the company to enter the Finnish nuclear power industry. 
Against likelihood, Fennovoima obtained a parliamentary go-ahead for a new greenfield site 
nuclear project in the parliamentary vote in 2010, whereas the well-established Fortum Plc was 
refused their application for a third reactor. It is already known that the next vote will not be taking 
place before the next elections in 2015. Hence the Fennovoima project is regarded as a one-time 
opportunity. Furthermore, as the company was founded only in 2007 to execute this one particular 
project, its capabilities are still relatively unknown in the industry. The vast scope of the project, the 
related investment risks and the one-shot nature of the project, combined with the infamous 
difficulties of the Olkiluoto 3 project, have created an interest for wider understanding on how to 
mitigate contractual risks and achieve a pareto-optimal outcome. 
This chapter discusses the Fennovoima project from three different angles, shedding more light on 
the procurement project and the related issues at hand. The first section presents the contracting 
timeline, and presents a simple figure illustrating the themes of this thesis with regards to the 
contracting timeline. The second section discusses the risk preferences of the contracting parties and 
their relevance vis-à-vis the Fennovoima project. Finally, the third section explores parallels with 
other fields of industry by providing an overview of the related literature. 
2.1  Contracting timeline 
The procurement process consists of several subsequent phases that are governed by different 
contracts. The first two Early Works Agreement contracts (EWA 1 and EWA 2) are signed with 
both supplier candidates in order to secure joint design development and ensure the suitability of 
each design. The preferred bidder is selected in 2013, and the Front-End Engineering and Design 
contract (FEED) is signed with one of the two suppliers in order to further develop the design. The 
potential main contract, the Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) contract will be 
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signed in 2015, and will cover the whole construction process from until the connection to the 
commercial grid.  
For simplicity, the contracting timeline so as to highlight the contractual risk that needs to be borne 
by either one of the contracting parties. The figure below (Figure 2: Risk vs. investment level) 
presents the interplay between investment and project completion in the Fennovoima project, and 
describes how the risk is shared between the contracting parties without any contractual 
intervention. Three main issues of this thesis are highlighted in the figure: selecting the best supplier 
before the contract is signed, incentivizing the chosen supplier to duly complete the project, and 
mitigating the underinvestment from initially low contractual coverage. The timeline is set out as 
follows: 
  Bid invitations sent out, project-specific investments initiated 
 Contract is signed 
  Contract is renegotiated as contingencies unfold 
  Project completion 
Before signing the EPC contract, the two competing suppliers bear a significant proportion of the 
investment-related risk. The degree up to which the contract-specific investments are covered by the 
contract is low at this early stage, but the design has to be developed so as to be licensable in the 
Finnish market. Until the contract is signed, this development involves a heavy supplier risk. 
Therefore, up until date 0, the suppliers’ incentives to reach contractual coverage are surprisingly 
strong, which in turn strengthens the competition between the two competing candidates. As a 
compensation for this risk, the supplier candidates are granted a bid bond in case the negotiations 
are unilaterally terminated. Once the contract is signed, the risk can be contractually shared between 
the two parties. Since the project is of zero value to the buyer until completion, the contract must 
involve strong incentives for the supplier to finalize the project. Due to the tight regulation and 
supplier-specific design, the buyer is locked into the supplier until completion. Therefore a 
procurement contract typically involves high breech clauses. 
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Figure 2: Risk vs. investment level 
2.2  Assumptions on risk preferences 
It has been stated (Allen & Lueck, 1995) that the standard risk sharing model consists of a situation, 
where the agent is risk-averse and the only margin for moral hazard is induced by the agent's effort; 
the principal cannot shirk. Allen and Lueck (1995) argue that the theoretical risk preferences of the 
contracting parties actually have no influence on the contract structure. They argue that individual 
risk preferences are not measurable, least dichotomous, and thus the general assumption of risk-
neutral principal and risk-averse agent remains weak. Allen and Lueck rely on empirical data in 
showing that 1) the traditional assumption about contracting parties' risk preferences may be 
incorrect and 2) the role of risk preferences is less pervasive in determining the contract structure 
than previously assumed.  
The liberal approach of Allen and Lueck (1995) is applied in selecting the model to be presented. It 
is easy to justify different views on the contracting parties risk preferences in the contractual setting 
at hand. The principal can be assumed to be risk-averse or risk-neutral. Theoretically, risk neutrality 
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is a safe assumption. Considering the ownership structure, risk-aversion also requires consideration. 
In reality, the principal’s action can quite easily tend towards risk-loving, due to the one-shot nature 
of the project. The agent’s preferences, in turn, can be either risk-averse or risk-neutral, depending 
on the relative weight of the Fennovoima project in their portfolio. As discussed above, defining 
risk preferences for the procurement project at hand seems redundant, and therefore they have not 
been allotted significant weight in the model selection in this thesis.  
2.3  Parallels with other fields of industry 
This section explores some parallels that can be drawn between nuclear power plant procurement 
and some other industries, and specifies how the empirical procurement literature can support the 
Fennovoima procurement project. The empirical studies are mainly located within defense 
procurement and large-scale construction projects such highway projects and building construction 
industry. John and Saunders (1983) have conducted one of the few empirical analyses about nuclear 
plant procurement. They conclude that contractors are unwilling to take on fixed-price contracts for 
nuclear power related procurement, unless the cost variance is reduced through repetition and 
experience or the customer is able to break the project in smaller parts with greater project and cost 
definition. 
A significant part of procurement literature explores the principal's make-or-buy decision. This 
refers to the principal's choice of producing the component itself instead of contracting an agent to 
produce it. It is stated (e.g. Bajari and Tadelis, 2001) that the complexity of the component 
determines the choice such that a simple component that is straightforward to contract upon will be 
bought, whereas a complex component with anticipated design changes is more likely to be 
produced internally. This approach has empirical support from aerospace industry (Masten, 1984) 
and automobile industry (Monteverde and Teece, 1982) where it has been shown that more 
complexity increases the likelihood of internal procurement. In the nuclear power industry, 
however, it is uncustomary that the client take production in-house. There are few examples of 
projects where the agent has become a partial owner of the project. For example, in the American 
South Texas Project, the Japanese Toshiba formed a joint venture with an energy company to 
become a stakeholder in the project (NINA Press release, 2010). Despite the theoretical support for 
internal production, it remains an interesting question for further research why vertical integration 
into the supply chain remains an uncommon practice within the nuclear power industry.  
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2.3.1  Defense procurement 
Defense procurement is one of the closest benchmarks to the nuclear power industry. The parallels 
can be mainly found within the riskiness of the projects, uniqueness of the design and the possibility 
for holdups due to the limited number of potential suppliers and clients in the market. Similarly, 
both industries face strict regulation and involve a high level of confidentiality.  
Hiller and Tollison (1978) explore the two extremities of the linear form of contract within the 
context of defense procurement. By the end of the 1970s it had been empirically proven that 
introducing incentive measures had improved cost measures relative to the target costs. The reasons 
behind this were twofold. First, in case of a cost overrun with an incentive contract, the principal is 
obliged to pay only a part of it. Second, since the agent will have to pay a portion of any cost 
overrun, there is a strong incentive to improve on cost efficiency. However, Hiller and Tollison 
(1978) list strong counterarguments that support the opposite view on incentive contracts. First, it is 
possible that the target costs in a fixed-price context are inflated compared to what they could have 
been in a cost-plus context, where the buyer compensated the supplier for his costs. Second, 
incentive contracts offer both higher negotiated target profits and higher final profits, and therefore 
the achieved production efficiencies must exceed the increase in the profit rates. Finally, if an 
investment involves an incentive for exceeding the targets, the total cost to the supplier might even 
be increased. However intuitive the increased cost efficiency under an incentive contract might 
seem, Hiller and Tollison make a convincing case against it. They argue that production costs are 
often confused with the total costs to the principal, rendering comparison useless. Moreover, higher 
profit rates of the agent, target value inflation, possible incentive costs and even higher 
administrative costs can outweigh the reductions in production efficiency.  
Baron and Besanko (1988) investigate procurement contracts in the context of defense procurement. 
In their model the government designs optimal linear contracts for a risk-averse agent in the 
presence of moral hazard, private information and an imperfect monitor. Crocker and Reynolds 
(1993) discuss major weapons systems acquisition where government has few, if any, alternative 
suppliers ex post, and gets thus locked into a contract in an early stage. They argue that the ability 
of the government to constraint the supplier's opportunism depends on the degree of contractual 
completeness.  They examine six alternative contract types with a varying degree of ex-ante and ex-
post negotiations. Contract types vary from a firm fixed-price contract, which allows no room for 
ex-post negotiations, to a fixed-price incentive contract, which involves an initial target cost and a 
high cost-sharing rate.  Crocker and Reynolds (1993) discover that cost-sharing contracts gain 
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popularity over time. They consider the agent's cumulative reputation as an important factor in this 
development, and state that long-term repeated contracting allows for less complete contract design. 
In a study on the economic incentives in defense procurement, Rogerson (1994) points out four 
distinguishing aspects: importance of R&D, large uncertainties, holdup problems created by 
specific investments and long lead-times, and large economies of scale. All but the last can be 
directly applied to nuclear power plant procurement. First, project specific R&D is necessary due to 
varying national regulation and requirements, which creates an opening for holdup situations from 
both agent's and principal's side. Second, both the immaturity of design and the external operational 
environment contribute to large uncertainties which are likely to involve a considerable cost risk. 
Third, relationship-specific investments are likely to lead to holdup situations where the contracting 
parties are locked into each other. Fourth, however, economies of scale are only present in multiple 
reactor projects, which has been quite unusual in the European context due to stringent regulation. 
For example, a Finnish nuclear power utility is unlikely to be granted two separate decisions-in-
principle within the lifetime of one unaltered design. 
Baron and Besanko's (1988) research about defense procurement resonates with Rogerson's (1994) 
findings that were described above. They define four features that complicate a procurement 
project. First, the cost-related risk requires specific attention to the risk-sharing structure of the 
contract. Second, large uncertainties and long lead-times involve private information. Third, the 
complexity of the projects renders accurate monitoring nearly impossible, and therefore the contract 
must be designed to mitigate the issue of moral hazard. Finally, it is impossible to separate the 
direct costs of a project from the overhead costs of the agent, which results in a noisy monitor. 
Therefore procurement costs are often based on imperfect monitoring of production costs. In fact, 
Baron and Besanko (1988) argue that due to the features listed above, the optimal contract in 
defense procurement deviates from the theoretical first-best solution, and that the direction of the 
deviation depends largely on the monitor, alleviating the moral hazard issues. The article provides 
parallels to the procurement project at hand: nuclear power industry and defense procurement can 
be inspected with the same tools. The empirical findings about military procurement by Baron and 
Besanko (1988, p. 519) support the view that fixed-price contracts are generally used for 
standardized products and repeated contracting, whereas cost-plus contract is widely used for 
complex products with severe cost randomness. 
One of the key differences between the nuclear power plant industry and defense industry is the 
relative weight of the parties. In defense procurement the principal, i.e. the state, can usually 
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allocate significant resources to the procurement process. Moreover, the make-or-buy decision is 
often worth considering, too. In contrast, in nuclear power plant procurement the relation is nearly 
inversed, especially in the Fennovoima case: the principal is a new entrant in the industry, whereas 
the potential agents are imposing in their size and scale of operations. 
2.3.2  Large-scale highway projects 
Bajari and Lewis (2009) assess efficient bidding and contracting in large-scale highway 
construction processes, aiming at timely completion of the projects. They examine a set of data 
from projects ordered by the Minnesota Department of Transportation, including both innovative 
and standard contracts. They argue that contractors respond to incentives as the theory predicts and 
that significant welfare improvements can be achieved by switching from a standard contract to 
socially efficient time incentives. The most advanced form of incentive contract involves two parts: 
a monetary bid for the labor and material costs, and a bid on the total number of days to complete 
the project. It is shown that these combined contracts result in significantly faster completion of 
project than the standard contract.  
Some parallels can be drawn between an extensive highway project and the procurement of a 
nuclear power reactor. However, in nuclear power industry quality issues are likely to gain 
significantly more weight than in a highway construction project. Therefore direct implementation 
of the advanced incentive contracts, shown to be efficient in highway construction, is likely to be 
too simplistic for reactor procurement. The most intuitive insight stems from a scoring auction, 
which is further explored in subsection 3.2.2 . Another distinguishing feature of a highway project 
is that the winning bidder is required to post a contract bond guaranteeing the completion of the 
contract according to specifications. Typically this bond is secured through a third party who will 
take on the bidder's obligations in case of default. Nuclear reactor projects, however, involve 
extremely high relationship-specific investments - a contract bond is unlikely to be high enough to 
cover for the financial loss in case of premature project termination and there exists no third party 
that could be able to take on the construction project in case of default.  
2.3.3  Building construction industry 
Similarities between large construction projects and building a nuclear power plant are plentiful and 
quite straightforward. Every project is unique and requires diligent coordination between the 
architect engineer, subcontractors and suppliers (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001). However, the nuclear 
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power industry involves more regulation per se, and is thus more likely to lead to holdups between 
the contracting parties. Similarly, the market structure is more rigid, allowing the contracting parties 
for more negotiation leverage. In construction industry, fixed-price contracts tend to be awarded 
through competitive bidding, whereas cost-plus contracts are negotiated privately between the 
principal and the agent. Occasionally cost-plus contracts are complemented with rewarding or 
penalizing incentives. The risk sharing arrangements are further explained in section 4.1.2 . 
The construction industry literature provides important insight into the risk sharing structure, as 
there is abundant empirical evidence on the topic. It has been found that a fixed-price contract in a 
complex project frequently leads to renegotiation. The agent is not willing to perform duties beyond 
those listed in the contract without additional compensation. According to Bajari and Tadelis 
(2001), there is ample evidence that ex-post changes are the rule rather than the exception. Reasons 
behind this include incompleteness of design, changes in scope and unpredictable site conditions.   
2.4  Linking the case company to the theory 
As has been discussed above, Fennovoima is in a challenging position as a newcomer in the nuclear 
power industry. In particular, the recent negative experiences about Finnish nuclear power projects 
add up as additional pressure towards the company. This chapter described the procurement 
situation with a simplified timeframe of the project, and with examples from benchmark industries. 
Some parallels between nuclear power industry in defense procurement were establishedThe 
following chapter employ this timeline such that chapters 3 and 4 focus on the static part of 
contracting theory, providing tools for bidding and contracting, whereas chapters 5 and 6 consider 
the dynamics of a long-term project.  
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3  Bidding  
In the bidding phase, the buyer's main concern is to select a capable supplier. The main risk during 
the bidding process is adverse selection. Adverse selection takes place when the supplier has private 
information about his type – whether he is likely or unlikely to perform well - and can induce the 
buyer to sign a contract which enables the supplier to capitalize on his superior information. 
Alternatively, adverse selection can occur when the better qualified suppliers get outbid from the 
competition, and the less qualified supplier wins the bid. A close example can be found within the 
Finnish nuclear power industry. It is commonly agreed that during the Olkiluoto 3 bidding process 
the suppliers' bids were pushed so low, and the schedule was drafted to be so tight that the winning 
supplier could do nothing but fail in fulfilling the targets. With this in mind, it is crucial to reflect on 
adverse selection and assess the theoretical findings on its mitigation.  
This chapter sheds light on the first stage of procurement contracting in which multiple bidders are 
still involved in the process. The topics include adverse selection and the optimal bidding 
mechanism design to its mitigation. The first section describes the simple theory: how asymmetric 
information can cause adverse selection and how it is theoretically mitigated through screening. The 
second section focuses on literature about the bidding phase, building on the theory from the first 
section. The question to be answered in this section is: What are the optimal bidding arrangements? 
The final section sums up the chapter by discussing some general remarks about the bidding phase 
in the context of the Fennovoima project. 
3.1  Adverse selection: A simple model 
Adverse selection occurs when the principal accepts the bid of an inefficient agent because it cannot 
observe the agents' expected production costs before awarding the contract. Typically the agent 
holds hidden information. This section examines bilateral contracts when one the contracting parties 
has private information. Two cases are generally recognized within adverse selection. In the first 
case, it is the uninformed principal who suggests a contract. In such a situation the uninformed 
principal faces a screening problem: he must try to screen the agents for their private information. 
In the second case, in contrast, it is the informed agent who suggests a contract. Here the agent 
faces a signaling problem: he must try to signal his quality to the principal. Adverse selection is 
typical of employee-employment relationships: the employer screens the potential employees for 
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their characteristics and attracts better qualified workers by offering a higher wage, or the potential 
employees signal their quality through e.g. education. (Bolton & Dewatripont, 2004) 
How efficient can contracting under asymmetric information be? According to the revelation 
principle, the answer is surprisingly simple: to determine optimal contracts under asymmetric 
information, it suffices to consider only one contract for each type of information the informed 
party might have, while making sure that each type has an incentive to select the contract that is 
destined to him. This is called incentive compatibility. This reduces the contracting problem under 
asymmetric information into a standard contracting problem with additional incentive compatibility 
constraints, and eliminates the need for communication between the contracting parties. (Bolton and 
Dewatripont, 2004) 
Bolton and Dewatripont (2004, pp. 17–19) present a simple contracting problem with hidden 
information. Their illustration of an employee–employer relationship is modified into a supplier–
buyer relationship for the purposes of this thesis. The modification entails excluding employee's 
preferences for leisure,  , and using a multiplication factor 1 instead of    . The buyer's utility 
function is then given by  (  )   , and the supplier's utility function by  ( ), where   is the 
buyer's monetary transfer to the supplier,   is a positive constant, and   is the skill level or the type 
of the supplier. The variable   is thus the state of nature, learned privately by the supplier before 
signing the contract. In particular, the supplier knows if he represents the good type,    , or the bad 
type,   , with      . The buyer knows only that the probability of facing a supplier of the good 
type is   . With a good supplier, the relevant reservation utility is  ̅   (  ), and with a bad 
supplier, it is  ̅   (  ). If the buyer could learn the supplier's type, he would offer in state    a 
contract with transfer       in exchange for the delivery of the product. Such a contract would 
maximize efficiency, and since the supplier's individual rationality constraint  (  )   (  ) would 
be binding under this contract, it would maximize the buyer's payoff.  
However, when the supplier's productivity is private information, the buyer is not able to achieve 
the same payoff as above. If the buyer offers a contract       in exchange for the delivery of the 
product, all supplier types would pretend to be skilled to get the higher wage   . If the output, 
however, is observable, the buyer can get around the informational asymmetry by including a 
money-back guarantee in the contract – if the product falls short of the promised quality level, the 
supplier refunds the difference to the buyer. Therefore the hidden information problems often 
include an assumption of unobservable quality (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2004). Another 
assumption is that the supplier cannot be punished ex post for a failure to reach the contracted 
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quality. If this is the case, then the bad type of worker can always pretend that he was unlucky. For 
simplicity it is thus assumed that the output quality is unobservable (Bolton and Dewatripont, 
2004). The definition of quality in the context of this thesis is discussed in detail in section 4.3 In 
order to proceed with the adverse selection assumption, it is useful to assume quality as a product 
feature that is defined over the lifetime of the nuclear power plant, and thus unobservable within the 
contracting period. 
Under the assumption of non-observability of quality, the only contract the buyer can offer is a 
simple transfer   in exchange for one delivered unit of product. According to the revelation 
principle, there exists a revelation mechanism with anequilibrium where the contracting parties 
truthfully report their types. It is then sufficient to offer two types of contracts,    and   , where 
contract    is the contract chosen by the type  . However, each contract has to be incentive 
compatible. That is, type    must prefer     over    , and type    must prefer     over    . Thus the 
optimal menu of procurement contracts can be represented as the solution to the optimal contracting 
problem under complete information 
   
   
*    ,        -      ,        - 
subject to the individual rationality constraints 
 (      )   (  ) 
and 
 (      )   (  ) 
and two additional incentive compatibility constraints 
 (      )   (     ) 
and 
 (      )   (     )  
The solution to this constrained optimization problem yields the most efficient contracts under 
hidden information. Adding incentive compatibility constraints results in a less efficient allocation 
than could be achieved under complete information. In general, asymmetric information leads to 
second-best contracts.   
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3.2  Optimal bidding process  
There is abundant mechanism design literature assessing bidding mechanisms. The focus is on 
mitigating adverse selection, which is commonly achieved through organized competition between 
several agents. In their study from 1992, Crémer and Khalil explore the agent's ability to gather 
information before signing a contract. They show that the bidding scheme – competition or no 
competition – as well as the number of agents involved in the bidding process significantly affect 
the principal's surplus. This holds if agent's cost of acquiring ex-ante information is low enough. It 
is shown that instead of informational symmetries or asymmetries, it is rather the agents' market 
position that affects the contract and the principal's surplus. If an agent is able to acquire 
information at low cost, the principal is induced into offering a better contract. Therefore, other 
factors held constant, the principal is better off contracting with the more ignorant agent. Valley et 
al. (1998) study the effects of communication on the efficiency of a contract. The study combines 
economic and behavioral analysis, and state that private information held by one party lead to a 
negative expected value for the uninformed party. Valley et al. argue that mutually beneficial 
outcomes can be more easily attained, if negotiation strategies include face-to-face communication 
among other elements of cooperation. They consider pre-bid communication as a means of 
mitigating adverse selection through a signaling game, and thus contribute to the reputation building 
literature, following e.g. Lewis (1986).  
Asker and Cantillon (2010), in turn, assess the principal's optimal buying mechanism when both 
price and quality are of importance to the principal. Asker and Cantillon define the optimal 
procurement mechanism for a single procurement contract. The theoretical optimal mechanism is 
then compared to simpler bidding mechanisms that are seen more regularly in practice. Whereas the 
theoretical optimal mechanism allows the principal to extract the whole strategic surplus from the 
contract, the first one of the simpler mechanisms, scoring auction, allows the principal to extract a 
significant proportion of the available strategic surplus. In contrast, the second mechanism assessed, 
a bargaining game, is likely to lead to a less desirable outcome. However, the assumption of 
contractible and endogenously determined quality sets severe limitations to the practical 
implications of the findings, since quality in the context of a nuclear power reactor is a 
multidimensional feature. As such, it can be debated whether quality can be contracted upon.   
A simple model of adverse selection and screening was presented in the previous section. This 
section, in turn, focuses on discussing a few more detailed models with particular attention to the 
practical implications and possible common features with the bidding situation that Fennovoima has 
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at hand. The first subsection discusses two models with different views on agent’s ignorance, 
concluding that the principal might be better off contracting with the more ignorant agent, and 
always better off when there is competition between multiple bidders. Whereas the first subsection 
points out the importance of competition, the second subsection focuses on assessing alternative 
ways of organizing the bidding process and managing competition. The final subsection briefly 
discusses the benefits of repeated contracting, which is a theoretically rewarding topic, but 
unfortunately of little practicality in the context of nuclear reactor procurement.    
3.2.1  Asymmetric information in bidding phase 
Asymmetric information can take multiple forms in the bidding phase. Three models presented here 
discuss its effects on contracting. The first model by Lewis and Sappington (1993) states that the 
agent’s enhanced information might lead to a higher surplus. Along the same lines, the findings of 
the second model (Crémer & Khalil, 1992) encourage contracting with an ignorant agent so that the 
principal will be able to capitalize on his superior information. The principal can interfere with the 
agent's informing efforts by encouraging competition between as many agents as possible. A third 
model by Lewis (1986) suggests contract bonds as a means of mitigating adverse selection. 
According to McAfee and McMillan (1986), a standard lowest price bidding process involves 
several informational asymmetries. Two of these three informational asymmetries are related to 
adverse selection. First, the principal cannot observe the bidders' expected production costs and is 
therefore unaware of which one of the bidders is an efficient supplier. Second, the bidders are 
unaware of each other's bids so that the bidders must place their bids in ignorance of the expected 
costs of their rivals. In the third case (explored also by e.g. Lewis, 1986), the principal's inability to 
observe the agent's cost-reduction effort opens a venue for moral hazard, which is explored in 
section 4.1 . Lewis (1986), in turn, argues that the principal's inability to acquire symmetric 
information can lead to a situation where the agent initially exerts high effort, resulting in a good 
outcome that is observable to the principal, until both sides are fully committed to the project. This 
reputation-building scheme, yet induced by asymmetric information and related to adverse 
selection, is further explored in the context of contracting in subsection 4.2.2 . 
As a contrast to the general assumption about the agent's superior information, Lewis and 
Sappington (1993) present an adverse selection model where the agent is as ignorant as the 
principal is. However, the agent is the only one to know whether he merely shares the principal's 
imperfect beliefs or has superior information. For instance, the reactor supplier and the client can 
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initially share the same imperfect information about the technology. However, the supplier's 
engineering and design efforts can sometimes provide the company with superior knowledge about 
the production costs. If these research efforts do not bear fruit, the supplier remains as ignorant as 
the client is. This is called bilateral ignorance.  
As opposed to the standard agency problem where principal is the ignorant party, Lewis and 
Sappington (1993) identify four qualitative changes that arise, when agent’s ignorance is introduced 
into the standard model. First, with an optimal incentive contract, the informed agent finds a region 
for pooling, where his costs are below the costs of an ignorant agent, and where the induced 
performance is insensitive to the superior information. Second, if the costs of an informed agent are 
above the expected costs of an ignorant agent, the informed agent produces small levels (or 
alternatively: low quality) of output. Third, the operations of the informed agent are more likely to 
be terminated by the principal when agent’s ignorance is a possibility. Fourth, the optimal incentive 
contract induces discontinuous levels of output, since small increases in costs exceeding expected 
costs of the ignorant agent induce large reductions in the performance of the informed agent. The 
abovementioned changes occur especially due to the principal’s effort to secure desirable behavior 
from the ignorant agent. As a consequence, the agent's profits may be substantially lower, when the 
possibility of ignorance arises. Therefore, the agent may be willing to incur personal costs ex ante to 
rule out the possibility of ignorance, thus informing himself, and assuring the principal of his ability 
and therefore securing better performance. This has potentially interesting implications in the 
context of the thesis: the supplier is able to increase the total surplus from the contract by investing 
in informing himself, and in signaling that they hold this information.  
Crémer and Khalil (1992) argue that in reality the asymmetry exists because principal and agent 
acquire different pieces of information. Thus the true asymmetry would lie in the ability to acquire 
information: the signed contract is influenced by the fact that the agent could acquire information ex 
ante at a very low cost. In the model, firm P wants to buy a component from firm A and offers a 
contract. A does not know precisely its disutility from producing the component but could 
determine it at some cost. This timeline presented in Crémer and Khalil (1992) shows that it is 
always preferable for P to offer a contract attractive enough for A to omit ex-ante cost analysis. 
After the contract is signed, A will acquire information about the disutility of production at no cost. 
This implies that acquiring information before signing the contract is socially wasteful, since this 
information will be discovered ex post in any case.  
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Following the logic of Crémer and Khalil (1992), it seems obvious that the principal will prefer 
choosing an agent with a high cost of acquiring information, as the principal is thus likely to gain 
informational advantage. This increases principal's expected surplus. The model also suggests that 
the gain to the principal due to a small increase in agent's cost of acquiring ex-ante information is 
entirely a transfer from the agent – the social welfare remains intact. Moreover, this implies that the 
principal would be willing to exert a costly effort in order to increase the agent's cost of acquiring 
information. This feature has interesting implications in the context of nuclear reactor procurement, 
in particular, as Fennovoima is negotiating in parallel with two potential suppliers. The practical 
implications of the model are further highlighted by the fact that one of the supplier candidates has 
experience from a similar nuclear reactor project in Finland, whereas the other lacks experience of 
building the particular reactor type outside its home country. Since information acquisition 
potentially yields informational rents to the agent, the principal is likely to prefer the agent with a 
higher cost of acquiring information. According to Crémer and Khalil (1992, p. 577), the increase in 
the expected welfare of the principal might be significant when contracting with an uninformed 
agent.  
In addition to the importance of information acquisition, Crémer and Khalil also demonstrate that it 
pays off to uphold competition between several agents (1992, pp. 575–576). In a comparative 
analysis of a single-agent game and a multiple-agent game, they show that increasing the number of 
agents who compete in a bidding process diminishes the benefit that any single agent can reap from 
ex-ante observation of costs. The principal collects rents from increasing competition. The principal 
can offer contract to several agents who fulfill the requirements and choose among those who 
accept the contract. This reduces the agents' value from ex-ante investigation and correspondingly 
increases principal's surplus.  
The main finding in Crémer's and Khalil's model is that if the agent’s cost of acquiring ex-ante 
information is small enough, the principal's expected surplus is increasing in the number of agents 
and the marginal value of this increase is proportional to the number of agents. However, this model 
does not account for the additional cost of including several bidders in a complex bidding process. 
In the nuclear power industry, and in particular in the Fennovoima case, the bidding process and the 
parallel negotiations with the bidders are lengthy and require project-specific investments in e.g. 
design work from both parties. Therefore the principal's surplus may no longer be increasing in the 
number of agents involved. This analogy holds with the findings of Crémer and Khalil (1992), since 
in the nuclear power industry the cost of acquiring ex-ante information is likely to be large. 
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Whereas Lewis and Sappington (1993) suggest that the principal can increase his surplus and 
mitigate adverse selection by choosing to trade with an agent who is willing to invest in informing 
himself, and Crémer and Khalil highlight the importance of maintaining competition, Lewis (1986) 
presents contract bonds as a means of mitigating adverse selection. If the agent is required to place a 
large enough performance bond, which would be refunded upon completion of the project, fewer 
contractors wish to be hired on hard jobs, as the project might get cancelled before they can recover 
their fixed costs. Therefore an agent who is likely to incur high enough costs for the project to get 
cancelled is likely to withstand from the bidding for a project.  
3.2.2  Managing competition 
The previous subsection concluded that adverse selection is best mitigated through competition; this 
subsection, in turn, discusses alternative ways of organizing and managing the bidding process. 
Asker and Cantillon (2010) present a model that compares alternative ways of organizing 
competition between agents. The model involves private information concerning the agents' 
marginal cost for providing quality and their fixed cost of production, which create participation 
constraints and incentive compatibility constraints for the agent. The buyer's objective is to 
maximize his expected utility subject to these two constraints. This maximization rule defines the 
optimal bidding mechanism. 
As described by Asker and Cantillon (2010), the first way of managing competition, a scoring 
auction, is presented as a means to promote both low price and high quality. A scoring auction is 
organized so that the principal announces the scoring rule, i.e. the way the offers will be ranked. 
This might take the form of a bid invitation specification, accompanied by a set of scoring criteria. 
The suppliers submit bids that cover every dimension of the bid invitation, and the contract is 
awarded to the bidder who scores the highest according to the scoring rule. In their analysis, the 
principal is able to reap a significant proportion of the strategic surplus through a scoring auction. A 
scoring auction could be further enhanced by involving a timing rule as presented by Bajari and 
Lewis (2009). Intuitively, the timing rule must be enforced by amending sanctions for a delayed 
completion of the project.  
Even though scoring auction maximizes competition between two agents, it leaves little room for 
flexibility in terms of design. However, a scoring auction is only secondary to the optimal bidding 
mechanism, since the efficient mechanism could be implemented by a scoring auction, but a scoring 
auction falls short in terms of flexibility. Despite the theoretical superiority of the optimal bidding 
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mechanism, it is hard to implement for two reasons. First, implementation requires precise 
knowledge about the environment and the realization of the future states. Second, it is impossible to 
design a simple, easily explained mechanism to implement the optimal bidding arrangements. This 
limits the principal's ability to explain the mechanism to the agent at a reasonably low cost and to 
administer the procurement process at a low cost. Therefore it is suggested that the simple second-
best solution, i.e. scoring auction, is likely to lead to a better outcome. (Asker & Cantillon, 2010) 
The second method listed by Asker and Cantillon (2010), bargaining, is defined such that principal 
negotiates with the potential suppliers one at a time. The principal approaches the agents 
sequentially and is allowed to haggle with each of them as much as he wants. However, the 
principal cannot return to an agent when negotiation breaks down, unless a recall option is 
introduced into the model. This way the agents do not compete directly against each other. 
Compared to a scoring auction, bargaining allows for more flexibility in terms of product design as 
the agent can present improvements during the negotiations. In particular, with a bargaining game 
the competition is lower since there is room for more variation in the competing products. 
The standard bargaining model by Asker and Cantillon is enhanced by allowing the principal to 
make an offer to one of the agents after negotiations have failed with all candidates. This recall 
option improves the expected utility of the principal, and also transforms the bidding game more 
resembling to an auction. In fact, if the recall option can be repeated, the form of the game becomes 
similar to an auction. Therefore it is straightforward to note that recall option increases the rents the 
principal extracts from the trade. However, a single recall option actually reduces the principal's 
commitment power, since the agents expect the principal to come back to either one of them with a 
more profitable offer. Therefore a higher offer is required for the trade to be accepted on the first 
round. 
Empirically, scoring auctions seem to dominate price-only auctions, whereas bargaining is a more 
common form of a less-structured bidding design, which is often implemented when quality matters 
(Asker & Cantillon, 2010). Auctions seem to lead to an efficient outcome only when the fixed costs 
are highly correlated with the marginal costs, or when the design is unlikely to require changes. 
Asker and Cantillon refer to defense procurement as an example: the product involves many 
dimensions with a varying degree of contractibility, and renegotiation of the contract is expected at 
many stages. It is straightforward to assume that procurement contracting for a nuclear power 
reactor involves multiple dimensions. The minimum requirements that have to be met are set by the 
regulating authority. But in a scoring auction the principal should be able to define the tradeoff 
 26 
 
between the price tag and additional security and usability features, timely execution included. 
Moreover, these features are often intertwined, so that the security features affect the operational 
factor of the plant through the downtime required. As the contract involves long-term commitment, 
it is necessary that the communications and safety culture between the agent and the principal level 
with each other. However, it is nearly impossible to create metrics for these issues. All this implies 
that even the most comprehensive scoring rule is likely to fall short of the real-life requirements.  
In contrast to the theoretical evidence of Asker and Cantillon (2010), bargaining seems to be 
surprisingly common in procurement contracting. This is assumed to be partially caused by project 
managers' will to control the bidding process. The non-contractibility of quality also seems to be an 
issue: through a bargaining game the principal is more likely to get to know with the potential 
suppliers, thus giving the supplier a chance to establish reputation and therefore allowing for trust-
based contracting. However, such familiarity-induced slackness in contracting is unlikely to take 
place in a multi-billion project with global competition. The support for either form of organizing 
competition remains twofold. The buyer faces a tradeoff between cost and quality: auction enhances 
cost-efficiency, whereas quality is more easily contracted upon by repeated bargaining. Involving a 
comprehensive list of quality features in a scoring auction may not be possible in the industry 
context.  
John and Saunders (1983) complement the discussion on managing competition by presenting a 
model where the number of potential bidders is severely limited. This corresponds with the 
procurement project Fennovoima has at hand, and is therefore worth noting. John and Saunders 
state that in initial procurement for new plant types and equipment the bidder's premium can be 
very large due to the lack of competition. They suggest that a bargained contract can actually 
outperform an auction in this setting. A bargaining process could enable bonding between the 
companies, joint design development and therefore create better incentives for cost reductions.  
3.3  General remarks about the bidding phase 
In the bidding phase, the main risk stems from the supplier's private information about his type – 
i.e. capability to deliver – and hence, adverse selection. The theory offers two main ways to mitigate 
this: screening, which is conducted by the uninformed buyer, and signaling, which is conducted by 
the informed supplier.  
Signaling provides few practical tools for the procurement project at hand; it is better suited for e.g. 
employment situations where the applicant signals his intelligence by having acquired higher 
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education. Signaling is based on the agent's initiative, and since the focus is on the buyer's scope in 
thus study, signaling is omitted in the analysis.  
Screening is of more practical importance in the bidding process: the buyer takes the responsibility 
for selecting a suitable supplier. In theory, screening takes place through a menu of contracts, from 
which the suppliers select the one that is suitable considering their capability and outside options. 
The outcome cannot be contractually dictated, and hence the supplier's type affects the probability 
of a successful project. In practice, screening takes place through the bidding arrangements. The 
literature recognizes competition as an important tool of screening. Two extremities for managing 
competition, auction and bargaining, are compared against each other. Bargaining seems to 
dominate over an auction: bargaining, when enforced with a recall option, allows for relational 
bonding and cooperation in design development. Even though an auction dominates in terms of 
cost-efficiency, adding recall options to the basic bargaining scheme increases its benefits. Most 
importantly, bargaining allows for iterative design development, whereas with an auction the design 
requirements must be complete at the time of bidding. 
As a final remark, it can be noted that if the bidders are likely to be equally capable, the buyer might 
benefit from contracting with the one who is most ignorant about the environmental characteristics 
that might occur during the contract so as to gain informational advantage over the supplier. The 
next chapter takes one step forward, contemplating the optimal contract to be made with the 
preferred bidder. 
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4  Contracting 
In the contracting phase, the buyer’s main concern is to maximize his utility. The main risk the 
buyer faces during the contracting process is the risk of moral hazard. Moral hazard occurs when 
the supplier has private information about his action and can use this information to acquire 
superior rents without exerting an optimal effort. In practice, in order to maximize the buyer’s 
utility, the contract must be designed so as to limit the supplier’s capability to capitalize on his 
private information, either by drafting a complete contract or ensuring that the same outcome is 
optimal for both parties. The structure of an optimal contract is central to the analysis of this 
chapter. Once the best seller has been chosen in the bidding phase, the seller must be incentivized 
into exerting an optimal effort, i.e. perform at the level where the marginal cost of an increase in the 
effort level equals its marginal benefit.   
This chapter provides a theoretical overview on the structure of an optimal contract in a risky long-
term project such as the procurement of a nuclear power plant. The main questions to be answered 
are related to informational asymmetry and, more precisely, to the risk of moral hazard. 
Informational asymmetry enables hidden action, which can negatively affect the outcome of a 
contract in the form of moral hazard. The first section presents an overview of a simplified 
theoretical model on these issues. The second section focuses on risk-sharing literature, providing 
insight into the optimal risk sharing structure for the procurement of a nuclear power plant, and 
building on the theory from the first section. The question to be answered in this section is: What is 
the optimal contract structure? The third section, in turn, focuses on quality literature, discussing the 
interplay between quality and cost. Finally, the chapter is concluded with general remarks about the 
contracting phase. 
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4.1  Moral hazard: A simple model 
Well, then, says I, what's the use you learning to do right when it's troublesome to do 
right and ain't no trouble to do wrong, and the wages is just the same? I was stuck. I 
couldn’t answer that. So I reckoned I wouldn't bother no more about it, but afterwards 
always do whichever come handiest at the time. 
–Mark Twain, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, quoted by Holmström and Milgrom 
(1987)  
 
Moral hazard occurs when the principal can only observe the outcome and not the action chosen by 
the agent. The hidden action of the agent enables him to make decisions that are not pareto optimal, 
allowing him to receive financial coverage for an effort which is less than optimal. Similarly to 
adverse selection (see section 3.1), which is induced by hidden information, moral hazard issues 
also stem from asymmetric information. In theory, moral hazard is best mitigated through 
monitoring, so that the principal receives a potentially noisy signal about the agent’s effort affecting 
the compensation scheme, or so that the compensation is based on the outcome rather than the effort 
level. The model presented here formalizes the moral hazard problem, whereas the following 
subsections present models of monitoring and effort-based compensation. 
Bolton and Dewatripont (2004, pp. 22–23) present a simple contracting problem with moral hazard. 
Their illustration of an employee–employer relationship is modified into a supplier–buyer 
relationship for the purposes of this thesis. The modification entails interpreting the amount of time 
worked,    , as the effort exerted by the supplier. Formally, to introduce hidden action into a 
contracting problem with uncertainty, it is supposed that the effort     is the supplier’s private 
information, i.e. hidden action. Moreover, the effort level     is chosen before the state of nature, 
  , is realized, and this effort affects the probability of the state of nature. When the supplier 
chooses action    , output for the buyer is simply    with a probability function   (   ), which 
is increasing in    , and    with a probability function   (   )      (   ). The common 
interpretation is that more effort (   ) produces higher expected output at cost   to the supplier. 
However, it is not guaranteed to induce higher output, since the bad state of world may still occur.  
Since the effort (   ) is not observable, the agent may be compensated only on the basis of 
realized output   . The buyer is thus restricted to offering a compensation contract  (  ) to the 
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supplier, i.e. a transfer   contingent on the state of world. The buyer must now account for the fact 
that (   )  will be chosen by the supplier to maximize his own expected payoff under the offered 
compensation scheme. This means that the buyer can only make a best guess that the chosen effort 
level is the outcome of the supplier’s optimization problem: 
(   )        
 ̃
*   (   ) , (  )   -    (   ) , (  )   -+ 
Now, when the buyer chooses the optimal compensation contract * (  )+ to maximize his expected 
utility, he must ensure that it is the supplier’s best interest to supply the right level of effort. The 
employer thus solves the optimization problem: 
   
 (  )
*   ,   - ,    (  )-    ,   - ,    (  )- 
subject to the individual rationality constraint 
  (   ) , (  )   -    (   ) , (  )   -   ̅   ( ) 
and the incentive compatibility constraint 
(   )        
 ̃
*   (   ) , (  )   -    (   ) , (  )   -+ 
Similar to adverse selection problems with hidden information (see section 3.1 when the supplier’s 
action is unobservable to the buyer, he must take into consideration not only the supplier’s 
individual rationality constraint but also his incentive compatibility constraint.  
Bolton and Dewatripont (2004, p. 23) point out that determining the solution to the optimization 
problem presented above is rather complicated. However, they emphasize the underlying idea of a 
trade-off between insurance risk, and incentives for exerting effort. In general, this means that the 
supplier should be rewarded for the outcomes that are most likely to arise when he exerts the 
required effort level, and punishing him for the outcomes that are likely to occur when he shirks. 
The application of this principle, however, yields complex compensation contracts, except for the 
case, where agent is risk neutral. In case of risk neutrality it is efficient to have the agent to take on 
all risk in order to maximize his incentives for effort provision.  
The following two subsections expand on the model presented above. The first subsection presents 
a simple model on mitigating moral hazard through monitoring the outcome with a costly monitor. 
The second subsection presents a model where one of the contracting parties is risk-averse, and the 
outcome of the contract is dichotomous, i.e. it is either a success or a failure. 
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4.1.1  Mitigating moral hazard through monitoring 
Whereas the standard agency problem, as presented above, assumes that actions are unobservable 
but the output is observable, for some agency problems even the level of output might be difficult to 
observe (Bolton & Dewatripont, 2004, p. 134). In this case, the contracting parties might choose to 
base the compensation on the observed effort level. Similarly, in long-term projects where the 
output cannot be observed until years later, the contracting parties might choose to compensate the 
agent for his effort already during the project so as to cover the agent’s expenses. The monitoring 
model presented next assumes that contracting on the output   is too costly, but the principal can 
observe the agent’s actions at a cost through monitoring. The effort can be verified at a monitoring 
expense . The full monitoring then solves 
   
  
 ( )      
subject to 
      
and 
    
which yields       and p’(  )   ; the agent’s compensation equals his effort in equilibrium. 
Suppose next that the principal can verify the agent’s action with probability 0,5 without spending 
 . If the agent is caught shirking, it is optimal to give him the lowest possible compensation. In this 
case, with a limited wealth constraint
1
, the variable   is set equal to 0 for simplicity. If the principal 
decides not to spend , his problem is 
   
  
 ( )    
subject to the incentive constraint 
          
The left hand side of the incentive constraint is the agent’s payoff if he chooses the prescribed 
action  . The right hand side is the agent’s maximum payoff is he shirks. In the borderline case it is 
optimal for the agent not to exert any effort and gamble on the possibility of getting caught. Now 
                                                 
1
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the principal has to give the agent a compensation that is twice his effort level; i.e. the principal 
gives the agent compensation he would lose when caught shirking. Having to give up rents once 
again lowers the principal’s desire to induce effort, so that the optimal effort is lower than   . 
Therefore the choice of whether or not to employ a costly monitor depends of the size of .  
The model presented above assesses a static contracting situation. However, the assumption of non-
observable outcome is surprisingly well-suited for the framework of this thesis. Once dynamics are 
introduced into the model, it becomes evident that output cannot be observed until the project is 
fully finished. Therefore monitoring becomes a viable option as a means of mitigating moral 
hazard, and its costs can be assessed against the framework presented above. In the procurement 
project at hand, the minimum requirement level is set by the Finnish Radiation Authority (STUK), 
who is also responsible for the monitoring. However, to ensure swift execution of the project and to 
avoid unnecessary delay, the principal benefits from employing a proactive monitor that follows the 
fulfillment of the quality standards. 
4.1.2  Dichotomous outcomes with risk-averse agent 
Bolton and Dewatripont (2004) improve the standard moral hazard model so that in addition to the 
agent choosing his effort intensity, the outcome is dichotomous – a success or a failure. The 
principal only cares about the outcome. However, exerting effort is costly to the agent, so the 
principal must compensate the agent for his effort. As the effort is unobservable to the principal, the 
principal cannot do better than to relate the compensation scheme to the agent's performance, i.e. 
the outcome of the project. Typically, this entails a loss, since performance is only a noisy signal of 
effort. The dichotomous outcomes encompassed by the model resonate with the reality: a nuclear 
power plant is either licensable or not – linearity of quality in this sense would therefore be of no 
additional value. The model is then expanded to cover risk aversion of at least one of the 
contracting parties. This assumption is similarly in line with reality – the scope of the project is long 
enough to entail bankruptcy, and neither of the contracting parties is willing to entertain this option.  
Bolton and Dewatripont (2004, pp.129–132) present a model where the output   can take two 
values:   *   +. With    , the agent's performance is a success; with    , the performance is 
a failure. The probability of success is given by   (   | )   ( ), which is strictly increasing 
and concave in effort intensity  . Assume that  ( )     ( )    and   ( )   . The principal's 
utility function is given by 
 (   ) 
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where   is the agent's compensation,   ( )    and    ( )   . The agent's utility function is 
 ( )   ( ) 
where   is the agent's cost of exerting effort,   ( )       ( )     and    ( )     For simplicity it 
can be assumed that  ( )     When the agent' action is observable and verifiable (to the principal 
or to a third party) the compensation scheme can be made contingent on the agent's action choice. 
The optimal compensation contract is then the solution to the following maximization problem from 
the principal's viewpoint: 
   
   
 ( ) (    )  ,   ( )- (   ) 
subject to    
 ( ) (  )  ,   ( )- (  )     ̅ 
where  ̅ is the agent's outside option, which can be generalized to 1 for simplicity. The Lagrange 
multiplier for the agent's individual rationality constraint is denoted by  , the first-order conditions 
with respect to    and   yield the following optimal coinsurance between the principal and the 
agent: 
  (    )
  (  )
   
  (   )
  (  )
 
The first-order condition with respect to effort is 
  ( ), (    )   (   )-    
 ( ), (  )   (  )-      
which, together with the optimal insurance rule, determines the optimal action  . 
Next, Bolton and Dewatripont (2004, pp.131–132) assume a risk-neutral agent, , ( )   -. The 
optimal action entails full insurance of the principal, with 
  
    
    and   (  )   . 
The marginal product of effort is thus equal with its marginal cost to the principal. When the agent’s 
choice of action is unobservable, the compensation of the agent cannot be made contingent on it. 
Therefore the output-contingent compensation must induce the agent to choose an action that 
maximizes his payoff: 
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 ( ) (  )  ,   ( )- (  )  
The second-best contract is the solution of the following 
   
     
 ( ) (    )  ,   ( )- (   ) 
subject to 
 ( ) (  )  ,   ( )- (  )      
and 
        
 ̂    
 ( ̂) (  )  ,   ( ̂)- (  )   ̂  
The first-order condition of the agent’s optimization problem is then given by 
  ( ), (  )   (  )-     
A unique solution exists to this equation for any compensation scheme for the two-performance 
contract (     ) presented above. The agent’s incentive constraint can be replaced by the first-
order condition. This substitution simplifies the analysis of the following case, where at least one of 
the contracting parties is risk averse.  
If the agent is assumed to be the risk-averse party, achieving the first-best solution requires a 
constant wage, independent of the agent’s performance and any risk associated. This, in turn, 
completely eliminates effort incentives, in case effort is not observable. If risk aversion is a bilateral 
feature, optimal risk sharing does not provide for full insurance of the agent, but still prevents the 
contracting parties from achieving first-best outcomes under moral hazard. In this case, the 
principal solves 
   
     
 ( ) (    )  ,   ( )- (   ) 
subject to 
 ( ) (  )  ,   ( )- (  )      
and 
  ( ), (  )   (  )-     
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Let   and   denote the respective Lagrange multipliers of the individual rationality constraint and 
the incentive compatibility constraint. Then derivation of the maximization problem with respect to 
  and    yields 
  (    )
  (  )
    
  ( )
 ( )
 
and 
  (    )
  (  )
    
  ( )
   ( )
 
When    , the optimal coinsurance rule, 
  (    )
  (  )
  , is obtained. However, at the optimum 
   , so that the optimal insurance is distorted: the agent gets a larger (smaller) share of the 
surplus in case of high (low) performance. In order to induce effort, the agent is thus rewarded 
(punished) for outcomes whose frequency rises (falls) with effort. In the two-outcome setting, the 
result is simple:     is rewarded, and     is punished. 
This rather complex modeling confirms the intuition about compensating the agent according to the 
outcome: a success is rewarded and a failure is punished. However, this approach fails to account 
for the exogenous risks that are likely to be faced during a complex long-term project. If, for 
instance, policy changes induce modifications in the industry regulation, the initial design might 
turn into a failure, in the sense of being no longer licensable. Therefore, in a long-term project both 
monitoring and results-based compensation need to be accompanied by a definition of the risk-
sharing structure, which is discussed in the next section.  
4.2  Optimal risk-sharing 
This section discusses optimal risk sharing structure, considering the limitations that the nuclear 
market specific features impose. More specifically, the section discusses how the risks related to a 
long-term project, such as the procurement of a nuclear power plant, are optimally shared between 
the principal and the agent, once the preferred bidder has been selected. Defining whether the 
principal or the agent bears the risks related to long-term contracting is necessary in order to 
provide incentives for both low production costs and sufficient production quality. The risk-sharing 
scale reaches from a fixed-price contract to a cost-plus contract. A fixed-price contract offers the 
seller strong incentives to cost reduction, but is best suited for products that are simple in design 
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that do not require modification or renegotiation. With a fixed-price contract the seller bears the 
exogenous risk, which is likely to show as an increase in the price of the original bids. In contrast, a 
cost-plus contract allows for greater flexibility in terms of design but offers no incentives for cost 
reduction efforts. With a cost-plus contract, however, the buyer is responsible for the exogenous 
risk, yielding lower original bids.  
The topic is divided into two subsections as follows. The first subsection discusses the optimal risk-
sharing rate in a procurement contract, formalizes its presentation and defines the parameters 
affecting the optimal choice. The second subsection gives an overview of two different models 
concerning the effects of reputation on the optimal contract. The first model concerns the 
principal’s reputation, and the second concerns that of the agent’s. The section is finalized with a 
brief example from the Japanese nuclear power plant industry, where reputation is highly 
appreciated by convention.  
4.2.1  Linear form of contract 
Linear formulation of contract is the simplest way of defining the risk sharing structure. The risk 
related to a procurement contract stems from the delays involved: the contracting parties make 
relationship-specific investments long before the outcome is realized. The investments involve a 
risk, which is typically increasing in contract duration. In particular, the supplier bears a major part 
of the risk. In order to induce the supplier to accept a contract, he needs to be either compensated 
for his risk, or the principal has to contractually relieve the agent from this related risk. The first 
option, compensation, is executed through a fixed-price contract, where the price has to be high 
enough to compensate for the risk. The second option, transferring the risk upon the principal, is 
executed through a cost-plus contract.  
Asymmetric information complicates the choice of the contract form. If adverse selection is 
considered a prevalent risk, and the agents have hidden information about their types, a fixed-price 
contract is not be the best alternative: the good type of agent might be excluded from the bidding 
process due to his higher bid. In contrast, if moral hazard is a prevalent risk, and the agent can exert 
hidden action, i.e. the principal cannot observe his effort level, a cost-plus contract is not desirable: 
principal has no incentive for cost reductions. The following models discuss the choice of the 
contract form and provide further insight into the characteristics affecting the choice.  
In a simple model of procurement contracting, the choice of contractual risk sharing structure takes 
place on a linear scale (e.g. McAfee & McMillan, 1986; Bajari & Tadelis, 2001). McAfee and 
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McMillan (1986) present the linear model of the principal’s contract payment as follows. For 
clarity, the notation follows that of Bajari and Tadelis.  
 ( )          
where c  is the ex-post cost of the project to the principal,    is the cost sharing parameter, b is the 
bid of the successful agent and   defines the proportion of the bid to be reimbursed to the agent. 
Therefore   is a constant parameter. In case of a cost-plus contract, where the agent is reimbursed 
for all his costs and the principal bears all related risk,    ,     and   represents the agent's 
profit. In case of a fixed-price contract, where the agent’s compensation is defined ex ante and the 
principal bears all related risk,     and    . In addition, there exists an intermediate form of 
the two, so that       and      . Despite the three parameters ( ,  , and  ), the only 
parameter of consequence is the cost-sharing rate  . In case of      , the agent's realized costs 
are not entirely covered by the principal. Therefore under an incentive contract, i.e. the agent bears 
at least a part of the costs, higher expected production costs force the agent to place a higher bid. It 
can thus be assumed, that in the case of an incentive contract low bids reflect high cost-efficiency. 
In contrast, in case of a cost-plus contract,    , a high-cost agent has no incentive to bid any 
higher than a low-cost agent. Therefore a cost-plus contract can never be optimal if there are 
multiple bidders: with n bidders, the principal will fail to select the most efficient agent with 
probability (   )  . It is thus argued that the cost-plus contract is of no relevance to the 
procurement of a nuclear power plant (McAfee & McMillan, 1986).  
The model presented above (McAfee & McMillan, 1986) can be further simplified. Parameters   
and   are inconsequential. Since any value of   results in similar bids across the agents and any 
positivie value of   results in similar payments, the notation can be simplified without loss of 
generality so that     and      . This leads to a simplified form, which is also presented by 
Cox et al. (1996). With this modification, the price for the trade with agent i as presented by 
McAfee and McMillan (1986) can be reformulated as follows: 
      (   ) 
   is the price of the contract to the principal,   is the bid price of the contract, c  is the base cost 
observable to all and    is the cost-sharing rate, i.e. the proportion of cost-overruns (or savings) that 
will be reimbursed by the principal (Cox & al., 1996, p.149). If    , the payment consists only of 
the costs incurred during the project. If    , they payment consists only of the winning agent's 
bid. If      , the payment is dependent on both the bid and the costs. If in this case the costs 
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exceed the bid (   ), the principal's payment is greater than the bidding price. If the bid exceeds 
the costs (   ), the payment is actually lower than the original bid. Hence the model does not 
provide any cost-reduction incentive for a cost-sharing contract, and therefore the simplified model 
by Bajari and Tadelis (2001) seems more realistic. They present the simplest formulation of the 
linear contract as follows: 
 ( )        
where   *   +. Similarly to the models presented above (Cox et al., 1996; McAfee & McMillan, 
1986)     is a fixed-price incentive contract with the agent's bid  as the price and     is a 
cost-plus contract that reimburses the contractor for his costs and provides him with an additional 
compensation of  .  
In McAfee and McMillan (1986, p. 328), the bidder's profit π equals the difference between the 
contract payment p and the sum of the observable costs c and the non-observable effort costs  (  ) 
of agent i. Now the contract profit for the agent i is given by: 
           (  )  (   )(    )   (  ) 
Each bidding agent knows their base cost c, the contract form   and the probability distributions for 
the others' base costs and the probability distributions for the others' uncertain costs. After all bids 
are submitted and the lowest bid is awarded the contract, the lowest bidder decides on the 
discretionary cost reduction    and learns about the realization of the random component   , which 
is also part of the observable cost of fulfilling the contract   . The observable cost of fulfilling the 
contract,   , consists of three components;   
  represents the certain base cost.  
      
        
Cox et al. (1996) follow McAfee and McMillan (1986) in deriving the low bidder's choice for 
discretionary cost reduction   . By maximizing the contract profit    with respect to    and 
assuming that the non-observable effort cost   ( )     , one obtains the first order condition for 
the agent's profit maximizing level of discretionary cost reduction. 
  (  
 )      
Since    ( )   , there exists an inverse,  ( ), to the function,   ( ), that is strictly increasing. 
Therefore, the model (Cox et al., 1996, p.150) predicts 
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   (   )  and 
   
 
  
    (   )      
From this it can be seen that the discretionary cost reduction    equals  (   ) and it decreases as 
the cost-sharing rate   increases. The principal's choice of cost-sharing rate   determines the agent's 
choice of cost-reduction effort. Thus the model predicts inefficiency, i.e. moral hazard, for cost-
sharing contracts. From a theoretical point of view, cost-sharing contracts are thus the least efficient 
in terms of cost-reduction. However, cost-sharing contracts are likely to be more tempting to the 
bidders, since they ensure that the principal bears a significant proportion of the risk related to 
unforeseen future contingencies. Therefore a cost-sharing contract might result in lower 
procurement expense than a cost-plus contract, if the bidding process yields bids that are low 
enough to offset the adverse selection and moral hazard costs of such contracts (Cox et al., 1996, p. 
171). In fact, McAfee and McMillan (1986) go as far as arguing that cost-sharing contract is the 
procurement cost-minimizing contract form. In contrast with this, Cox et al. (1996) argue that 
lowering procurement expenses by attracting lower bids with a cost-sharing contract can potentially 
lead to documentable cost overruns and even a bankruptcy of the principal, in case the costs from 
moral hazard are high enough.  
If the design of the product is successful, a fixed-price contract incentivizes the agent to cost-
reductions through ex-ante competition between potential contractors (e.g. Bajari & Tadelis, 2001). 
By allowing the agent to reap all surplus incurred by cost savings, a fixed-price contract strongly 
incentivizes the agent to efficiency. A fixed-price contract does not require the measurement of 
construction costs, which renders it a common contract form in procurement contracting.  
If the design is likely to fail or require modifications, a cost-plus contract should be preferred. 
Firstly, with a fixed-price contract some of the surplus will be eroded because of ex-post 
renegotiation costs. These costs occur since the original contract requires costly modification due to 
the unanticipated state of the world. Moreover, the ex-ante competition is already initially limited 
due to the particular market features of the nuclear power plant industry (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001). 
Thus a fixed-price contract is not necessarily as strong an incentive for ex-ante cost reduction 
within the context of this thesis: the ex-ante competition is less fierce than in other industries. 
Therefore, the principal’s utility from a cost-plus contract is increasing in the complexity of the 
product. John and Saunders (1983, p. 397) support this view in their model about optimal incentives 
for cost reduction in power plant projects. They conclude that tailor made projects that involve high 
cost variance minimize their cost of procurement by using a cost-plus contract. However, if the 
contract is repeated over time, the cost variance should decrease; a transition towards incentive 
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contracts might be observed. Moreover, John and Saunders present a case with potential 
implications to the Fennovoima project. As a part of their empirical analysis, John and Saunders 
(1983, p.402) assert that an agent is likely to be reluctant to take on contracts of fixed type unless 
the cost variance is diminished through experience and repetition, or unless the principal is able to 
break the procurement into smaller parts, giving each individual procurement greater project and 
cost definition.  
Exogenous risk affects the choice of the contract structure. Both parties share uncertainty about 
changes in design requirements and regulatory environment that occur after the production begins. 
Cost-plus contracts account for a high probability of future adaptation, i.e. the degree of contractual 
completeness is low (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001). As opposed to fixed-price contracts, a cost-plus 
contract does not erode the principal's ex-post surplus through increased negotiation costs. 
However, it discourages the agent from ex-ante cost efficiency. Bajari and Tadelis concentrate on 
problems of adaptation when the initial design is endogenously incomplete, and could thus be 
enhanced during the contract period. They suggest that high cost-reduction incentives such as a 
fixed-price contract do succeed in reducing costs, but at the same time dissipate the potential of 
increased ex-post surplus, due to the increased renegotiation costs that occur under asymmetric 
information. Fixed-price contracts thus lead to inflexible contracts, which are costly to renegotiate, 
and are thus ill-suited for complex contracting environments.  
McAfee and McMillan (1986) argue that the tradeoff between risk sharing, incentives and 
information revelation cause contracts that lie between fixed-price (   ) and cost-plus (   ) be 
generally desirable. In their study, cost-plus contracts are never optimal since they offer no 
incentive for the suppliers to bid aggressively against potential competitors. This is also relevant to 
the nuclear power industry. Since contracts are seldom repeated, the threat of losing a contract 
because of bad performance in the past is weak. Therefore, a cost-plus contract is unlikely to induce 
cost-aware behavior as the principal bears all cost-related risk. 
As seen above, the maturity of product design and regulatory environment, i.e. both endogenous 
and exogenous risk, affect the contract design and the optimal risk-sharing structure. The next 
subchapter develops the theme further, discussing the effects of reputation. 
4.2.2  The effects of reputation on risk-sharing 
Both principal's and agent's reputation from previous projects affect the optimal contract structure. 
In an empirical study about defense procurement, Rogerson (p. 69, 1994) focuses on the principal's 
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reputation. According to Rogerson, the principal "would often benefit in the short run from 
reneging on its commitments and negotiating the lowest possible prices for the current period's 
contracts." In the long run, however, the principal would be worse off, since its partners would no 
longer be willing to commit to relationship-specific investments. Clearly this approach applies the 
best to repeated procurement. However, if the principal ever intents to take on a second 
procurement project, safeguarding its reputation is crucial in order to maintain negotiation power 
and to render commitment attractive.  
Another approach to the reputation issue is presented by Baron and Besanko (1988) and Crocker 
and Reynolds (1993) as concerning the agent's reputation. A small number of past lawsuits or 
recorded disputes can be seen as a signal of the trustworthiness of the agent, thus affecting the risk 
sharing structure as follows. An agent with good reputation is more likely to perform well under a 
cost-plus contract, in which all the costs are inflicted on the principal. In contrast, bad reputation 
has a direct linkage to potential moral hazard thus favoring a contract tending towards a more fixed 
pricing structure, providing the agent with an incentive to reduce costs. The logic is rather intuitive: 
a supplier with a track record of contractual disagreements can be considered likely to exploit a 
cost-plus contract in terms of cost efficiency and even false cost reimbursements. Similarly, a 
supplier with a solid track record is likely to be willing to keep up with its reputation and can thus 
be induced to cost efficiency even under a cost-plus agreement. 
Applying the insight about the effects of reputation to nuclear reactor procurement is an interesting 
topic. On one hand, Fennovoima is a project company, founded specifically to execute a one-time 
construction project of a nuclear power plant. From Fennovoima's point of view it is important to 
establish reliable ex-ante reputation – the company has to be capable of convincing the potential 
suppliers to commit to relationship-specific investment. In this sense, the presence of the German 
energy conglomerate E.ON has been a valuable asset to the project, as the company has held a 
significant position in the European nuclear power industry. However, the Finnish nuclear power 
policy sets quite clear limitations to the scope of Fennovoima: the Hanhikivi 1 project is a one-of-a-
kind opportunity. This, in fact, allows the company for ex-post bad behavior – of which the supplier 
is aware.  On the other hand, the supplier is aware of the fact that cooperation with Fennovoima will 
be over after the Hanhikivi 1 project is complete. Therefore the supplier has no incentive to 
overplay its contractual responsibilities – on the contrary, it is likely to shirk wherever possible. 
However, due the thinness of the nuclear reactor market, the supplier has its reputation to safeguard. 
A poorly performing reactor supplier is likely to suffer from a loss of reputation in the long run. 
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The Japanese contracting method forms a striking counterexample: the three Japanese nuclear 
reactor manufacturers – Toshiba, Hitachi and Mitsubishi – have employed a sequential rotation in 
filling the roles of the reactor supplier, turbine supplier and architect engineer. Combined with the 
frequency of past nuclear projects, this cooperation has allowed for incomplete contracting and less 
stringent bidding procedures. The extent to which the flexibility induced by such reputation 
building has enabled the Japanese nuclear power plant constructors to execute record-fast 
construction project remains an important question.    
4.3  Incentives to achieve high quality  
It has been empirically proved that in a procurement process, the principal faces a trade-off between 
high quality and low cost (Cox et al., 1996). High quality is achieved through a low-incentive cost-
plus contract which enables the agent to focus on quality requirements instead of aiming at 
increasing his own profit through cost reductions. In contrast, low cost can be achieved through a 
high-incentive fixed-price contract. With a fixed-price contract, however, the agent is more likely to 
cut corners wherever contractual incompleteness allows. This section discusses three approaches to 
encouraging quality at a low cost. The section is divided into three subsections as follows. The first 
subsection focuses on enhancing quality through the principal’s monitoring efforts. The second 
subsection, in turn, introduces third-party verification into the setting, instead of bilateral 
monitoring. The final subsection makes a general remark about design-related incentives in the 
empirical context of defense procurement. 
4.3.1  Monitoring for quality 
Baron and Besanko (1987) assess monitoring as a means to control quality in the context of defense 
procurement. In their model an imperfect monitor is used to mitigate the risk of moral hazard, 
stemming from private information. They assess a costly monitor and weigh the monitoring 
expenses against the payments the principal must make to induce the agent to reveal his private 
information. In the model, Baron and Besanko (1987, p. 510) consider two special cases. The first 
case involves a risk-averse agent with random cost and a perfect monitor. The optimal contract in 
this case relieves the agent of some of the risk from the random cost, and subsidizes the agent for 
his effort, since he otherwise would exert a suboptimal effort level. The second case involves 
deterministic costs and a noisy monitor. In this case the principal chooses to impose risk on the 
agent in order to reduce the information cost associated with inducing the agent to reveal his private 
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information to the principal. Thus, in the case of deterministic costs and a noisy monitor, the 
payment to the principal is a function of the monitor, and the principal may choose to tax the agent's 
effort in order to reduce the information costs. The first case comes closer to the Fennovoima 
project: the monitor technology can come close to perfect at a cost, but the cost structure is certain 
to include random elements that cannot be pre-specified.  
An optimal contract induces the agent to produce such a quality that the marginal benefit from it 
equals the marginal cost of production (Lewis & Sappington, 1993, p.172). In the case where a 
monitor is employed in order to mitigate the moral hazard problem, the marginal benefit from 
quality must equal the modified marginal costs of production, which includes the costs of acquiring 
information. This implies that the agent's incentive is always to exaggerate the marginal cost in 
order to increase the marginal benefit. As the highest realizations of marginal cost are extremely 
expensive to the principal, the production is likely to be terminated in these cases. This corresponds 
to the case of noisy monitor by Baron and Besanko: the agent’s incentives to exaggerate his costs 
can be mitigated through an incentive contract or by actually taxing the agent’s excessive effort.   
The quality of information obtained through monitoring depends on the resources committed to this 
activity and on the available technology (Harris & Raviv, 1978). Consequently, the optimal contract 
structure also depends on the available monitoring technology. In their model, Harris and Raviv 
(1978) limit the principal's scope. In this case, monitoring is the only way the principal can affect 
the payoff of the relationship. The analysis focuses on the contract which specifies how this payoff 
is shared between the two parties. Similar to the simple model in subsection 4.1 .2, they argue that 
the optimal outcome is dichotomous. If monitoring reveals the actions to be acceptable, the agent is 
paid according to a pre-specified schedule. Otherwise, the agent receives a less preferred fixed 
payment (Harris & Raviv, 1978). However, termination of the project is highly unlikely in the 
context of building a nuclear power plant, since the both parties have committed to relationship-
specific investments. This often necessitates renegotiation, further explored in section 6.3 , which is 
likely to be induced by holdup situations, discussed in section 5 . Instead of dismissal, the principal 
can resort to penalizing the agent, whenever the effort level is monitored to be suboptimal.  
However, according to McAfee and McMillan (1986), imperfect information on the agent's action 
brings additional uncertainty to the model, and induces ambiguous effects. If both the agent and the 
principal are risk averse, the uncertainty tends to reduce overall welfare. The risk-aversion of the 
agent induces the principal to take on a proportion of the risk of cost fluctuations, which reduces the 
agent's cost-efficiency incentives. The winning bidder makes an unobservable effort decision, and 
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instead of employing a costly monitor of quality or effort level, the principal opts for compensating 
the agent for the incurred costs, which are easier to detect. Thus a cost-plus contract, which employs 
a monitor for costs, is an option for mitigating moral hazard (McAfee & McMillan, 1986). On the 
contrary, if imperfect information induces the principal to employ a credible monitor, the agent can 
be motivated to make an effort which leads to a pareto-optimal outcome (Harris & Raviv, 1978, p. 
248). The credibility of a monitor can be established through investing in the monitoring technology 
so that the monitor is noise-free. The gains from monitoring decrease to zero as the monitor 
becomes noisier.  
If a credible enough monitor cannot be applied, the buyer has no other means of mitigating moral 
hazard than resorting to either a complete fixed-price contract or ex-post compensation that depends 
on the outcome of the project. As there is ample theoretical evidence against fixed-price contracts in 
the industry context, the following subsection moves on to assessing verifiability of quality, which 
is required in case of ex-post compensation. 
4.3.2  Verifiability of quality 
Lewis and Sappington (1991) discuss the impacts of the verifiability of quality, which can be used 
as an instrument to better incentivize the agent to provide the desired quality level. The essential 
task of the principal is to motivate the agent to provide a high-quality product while limiting the 
agent’s rents (Lewis & Sappington, 1991). The verifiability of quality reduces the cost of producing 
quality, which in turn benefits the principal. Instead, if quality is not verifiable, the agent does not 
benefit from producing quality. With verifiability, the agent is compensated for the enhanced 
quality and thus for the underlying effort level. As producing quality is now less costly, more 
quality is secured by the agent, which further increases the principal's welfare. In applying the 
model to the nuclear reactor procurement setting, the notion of quality requires further 
consideration. The quality requirements as such are exogenously given, and enhancing quality over 
this threshold level does not necessarily increase the buyer's utility. The long-term operational 
performance of the power plant can be interpreted as quality, but most of the commercial operation 
takes place after the contracted period. Quality, as understood on the company level, encompasses 
multiple dimensions, including ISO standard-based features, requirement by the radiation authority 
and timely delivery. In assessing the model by Lewis and Sappington, it can be assumed for 
simplicity that quality refers to the timely delivery of a licensable product, i.e. a reactor the features 
of which comply with the threshold requirements. Timely delivery, interpreted as quality in the 
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model, increases the buyer's valuation, due to the buyer's discount factor and preference for 
connecting the reactor to the commercial grid rather sooner than later.       
In the analysis of Lewis and Sappington (1991, pp. 374–375), quality is unverifiable, and the buyer 
faces an incentive problem as the compensation cannot be explicitly linked to the quality delivered. 
In this case the buyer must be aware that the quality level cannot be contractually defined. Instead, 
the supplier provides the level of quality he finds to be most profitable. Therefore, in order to 
induce the supplier to provide a higher level of quality, the compensation must be set above the 
supplier's marginal cost. It is well justified to assume that in nuclear reactor procurement the level 
of quality is observable, to the buyer as well as to third parties, especially if the timeliness of 
delivery is considered as the primary quality feature. Therefore the mathematical presentation of 
motivating optimal quality is omitted in this context. In comparing the two cases (Lewis and 
Sappington, 1991, pp. 376–377), however, it is pointed out that the tradeoff between low cost and 
high quality implies that when the quality is unverifiable, the principal settles with lower level of 
quality. Verifiability of quality, instead, allows for all but non-pricing decisions to be left out of the 
contract and does not exclude cost efficiency. In a comparison of the two versions of the model, 
verifiable and non-verifiable quality, Lewis and Sappington (1991, p. 377) conclude that even 
though the verifiability increases supplier's rents, the total surplus increases even more. Numerical 
comparison of the model reveals that when quality is verifiable, the price is set at the level of 
production costs. In contrast, with unverifiable quality, price tends to be significantly higher.  
Verifiability of quality brings along undisputable benefits. However, creating a compensation 
scheme based on quality brings along additional considerations, as all desired quality features 
would need to be accounted for. In fact, it is generally acknowledged that an incomplete 
compensation scheme might shift the agent’s focus towards maximizing the verifiable part of the 
effort at the expense of the unverifiable part. In the context of this thesis, this risk speaks in favor of 
a comprehensive ex-post compensation scheme that is based on the timeliness of the project 
completion and the operational factor of the nuclear facility over its lifetime. 
4.3.3  Designing for quality 
Another example of the tradeoff between high quality and low cost concerns the design. Similarly 
to Rogerson's (1994) idea about defense procurement, nuclear power companies also face a problem 
of providing incentives for R&D, since these companies are unable to move the production in-
house. This is largely due to the vastness of the scope as well as regulatory reasons. There are very 
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few examples worldwide of nuclear power plant companies that would have had a major role in the 
research and development of a new product. More precisely, a small new entrant in the market is 
very likely to be excluded from most of the design process. Moreover, in contrast with defense 
procurement, where a government is willing to incentivize innovation, the design of a nuclear 
power plant must be near-to-complete by the time of contracting in order to be granted permissions 
to proceed. However, internalizing some of the R&D related risks is identified as way of 
simultaneously incentivizing high quality through more mature design and lower costs through 
better goal alignment of the cooperating parties (Rogerson, 1994).  
In a procurement setting for a nuclear reactor, it is commonplace for the design to be close-to-
complete by the time of the bidding phase. The bid invitations as well as the bids are based on at 
least preliminary design, most of which has been conducted independently of the potential buyer. 
However, come the time of bidding, an early works agreement (EWA) is signed. The purpose of 
EWA is specifically to engage the parties in joint design development, so that the design would 
comply with the local regulation. Despite the cooperation at late stages of the R&D work, the 
supplier still bears a major proportion of the investment risk. Nonetheless, the EWA procedure 
stands as an example of how a part of the R&D related risk is internalized by the principal in order 
to achieve higher quality in the spirit of Rogerson (1994). 
4.4  General remarks about the contracting phase 
In the contracting phase, the primary endogenous risk stems from the supplier's private information 
about his action choice – i.e. the exerted effort – and hence, moral hazard. Theoretically, moral 
hazard is mitigated through monitoring, which enables rewarding or punishing the supplier for his 
effort. However, as the effort is unlikely to be observable by the buyer or a third-party monitor, the 
compensation should be based on the ex-post outcome. In this case a monitor is no longer actually 
needed. 
Whereas monitoring or the division the ex-post surplus act as tools to mitigating the endogenous 
risk of moral hazard, the exogenous risks are best covered through defining the risk-sharing 
structure. The risk-sharing scale reaches from a fixed-price contract to a cost-plus contract. A fixed-
price contract offers the seller strong incentives to cost reduction, but is best suited for products of 
simple design that do not require modification and renegotiation. With a fixed-price contract the 
seller bears the exogenous risk, which is likely to show as an increase in the original bids. In 
contrast, a cost-plus contract allows for greater flexibility in terms of design but offers no incentives 
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for cost reduction efforts. With a cost-plus contract, however, the buyer is responsible for the 
exogenous risk, yielding lower original bids.  
It is important to notice that moral hazard cannot be fully mitigated through the risk-sharing 
structure. Instead, the risk-sharing rate reflects whether costs or quality are of greater importance to 
the buyer. Similarly, a monitor is only a tool of compensating the supplier for his effort or for his 
costs. Moral hazard can only be fully eliminated if the supplier's payoff is made contingent to the 
outcome of the procurement process, i.e. the contract involves sharing of the ex-post outcome. This 
conclusion is a step towards a more dynamic setting, in which the contracting parties participate in a 
sequential game, thus enriching the theory. The following two chapters consider additional dynamic 
features, namely holdups and renegotiation, adding to the findings supporting ex-post 
compensation.  
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5  Holdups 
When long project duration is added to the basic procurement setting, holdup situation becomes a 
relevant threat. Holdups arise in bilateral trade in the contracting phase when the unavoidable 
contractual incompleteness leads to investments that are below the socially optimal level. In a 
complex long-term project, the initial relationship-specific investment is likely to exceed the degree 
of contractual coverage. If investment-related information could be specified, and complete 
contingent-proof contracts could be written, the holdup problem would not arise. However, specific 
investments are involved and contracting is incomplete (Che & Hausch, 1999). In the procurement 
of a nuclear reactor, the supplier's initial investment to the design is unlikely to be covered by the 
contract. Moreover, as the design requires country-specific modifications, the supplier's investment 
becomes in reality relationship-specific. Therefore the related underinvestment problem requires 
careful consideration. 
This chapter provides a theoretical overview on holdup situations in risky long-term projects, 
introducing dynamics into the static setting of the previous chapters. Allowing for changing 
contingencies brings the setting closer to the contracting reality. At the same time, the results are 
less general, which complicates determining practical implications. Modeling a multi-stage game 
with exogenous risk is a challenging task. Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to assessing a simple 
formulation of the problems at hand, and providing insight into the optimal contracting with 
descriptive models about the optimal characteristics of the contracting parties. The first section of 
this chapter presents a simple model of holdups and a definition for the abovementioned 
underinvestment problem. The second section introduces some theoretical findings about mitigating 
underinvestment and circumventing the holdup problem. The articles reviewed are selected so as to 
provide insight into the contracting challenge Fennovoima is facing. Finally, the third section makes 
general remarks about the holdup literature and its practical implications. 
5.1  Holdup: A simple model 
A holdup situation leading to underinvestment occurs when relationship-specific investments are 
introduced in a contracting situation. This means that the supplier's default payoff increases less 
than the gain from trading with the buyer: the supplier's marginal return to his investment is no 
longer the same independent of whether he sells to the buyer or on the spot market. Thus the first-
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best investment level is not automatically achieved. The formal presentation of this problem is 
central to this section.  
Bolton and Dewatripont (2004 pp. 560–562) present the holdup problem by a simple model as 
follows. There are two contracting parties, a prospective buyer and a prospective supplier, who can 
enter a relationship in which they can end up trading a quantity   ,   - at a price  . At this point 
it is important to note, that in order to apply the model in the context of nuclear reactor 
procurement, quantity must be interpreted as quality. From now on, the notation is referred to as 
level of trade. Their utility from the trade depends on the buyer’s valuation   and the supplier’s 
production cost  . These utilities are uncertain at the time of contracting and can be influenced by 
specific investments made by each party at an earlier date. The following assumptions are made: 
  *     +         (  )    
where the buyer’s cost of making an investment   is  ( ), and 
  *     +         (  )    
where the supplier’s cost of making an investment is ( ). The investment functions are increasing 
and convex, and the investments are sunk whatever the ex-post level of trade. The ex-post payoffs 
are thus 
      ( ) 
for the buyer, and 
      ( ) 
for the supplier. The timing is as follows. First, the parties contract; second, they simultaneously 
choose their investment levels   and  ; third, the both learn the state of nature,   (   )  affecting 
the buyer’s valuation and the supplier’s cost, and fourth, the contract is executed. 
For simplicity, it is assumed that            . Under this assumption, the ex-post efficient 
level of trade is     if   (     ) and 0 otherwise. Since the parties are assumed to be risk 
neutral, the ex-ante efficiency is equivalent to investment efficiency, i.e.   and   must result from 
   
   
*  (       )   ( )   ( )+ 
The first-order conditions yield the optimal investment levels    and   : 
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  (      )    ( 
 ) 
and  
  (      )   
 (  )  
In the standard contracting problem the state of nature   (   ) and the investment levels    and   
are not contractible, although the state of nature is observable to both parties ex post. If ex-post spot 
contracting is possible, and if the gains are evenly divided between buyer and supplier, there will be 
underinvestment in equilibrium after   is realized and investments   and   are sunk. Figure 3: 
Underinvestment with holdup problem  below illustrates this. The black curves represent the 
optimal investment functions    and   , and the grey curves represent the best response functions 
under spot contracting, given by 
 
 
 (      )    ( 
  ) 
and 
 
 
 (      )    ( 
  ) 
The difficulty faced by the contracting parties in a dynamic setting with uncertainty is how to 
formulate an optimal long-term contract that is independent of the state of nature, which mitigates 
this underinvestment problem, moving the investment levels from the second-best equilibrium 
toward the first-best equilibrium. 
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Figure 3: Underinvestment with holdup problem  
The following subsection presents one approach to mitigating the underinvestment problem. Bolton 
and Dewatripont expand on the model above, and present a solution where underinvestment is 
avoided by awarding one of the two contracting parties full bargaining power.   
5.1.1  Mitigating underinvestment with bargaining power 
Bolton and Dewatripont (2004, pp. 563–564) present a positivistic solution to mitigating 
underinvestment. In the model, it is assumed that the parties can specify default options whenever 
trade is possible. The level of trade,  ̃, is defined such that 
 ̃(      )    ( 
 ) 
where  ( ) is the supplier’s payoff. The following contractual mechanism can be considered: Once 
the state of the world   has been realized, the parties play the following game: in stage 1, the buyer 
can make an offer (   ) to the supplier; in stage 2, the supplier accepts the offer and trade takes 
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place at these terms, or rejects it, in which case  ̃ is traded at a prespecified price  ̃ designed to 
share ex-ante surplus according to initial bargaining shares. The buyer has full bargaining power in 
this first version of the two-stage game; he will therefore offer to trade the ex-post efficient quantity 
while leaving the supplier indifferent between trade and his default option. This is sufficient to 
guarantee ex-post efficiency. However, as described in section 5.1.1 this is not a sufficient condition 
for the investments to be efficient. The supplier anticipates obtaining his default option payoff 
whatever the ex-post level of trade, so he solves 
   * ̃      ̃  (   )   ̃   ( )+ 
Given the interpretation of  ̃, investment level    is the supplier’s optimal choice, whatever the 
buyer’s investment. Finally, as the buyer has full bargaining power, he is the residual claimant on 
her investment and solves 
   *   (      )  , ̃   
    ̃  (   
 )   ̃   ( )-  
The buyer thus maximizes total surplus minus the payoff of the supplier, which does not depend on 
the investment of the buyer, and minus his own investment. Consequently, the buyer chooses      
and the supplier chooses     .  
The mechanism described above induces efficient bilateral investments. For the buyer, the efficient 
investment level is achieved by making him the residual claimant. The supplier, in turn, is 
incentivized into efficient investment behavior despite having no bargaining power at all. The 
supplier’s incentive to invest stems from the default option, whose attractiveness rises when his 
production cost decreases. The existence of the default option thus makes the supplier sensitive to 
his investment.  In the context of nuclear power reactor procurement, however, the existence of a 
default option is an unrealistic assumption – a half-built nuclear power plant is hardly of any value. 
Therefore it is straightforward to assume that a default option alone is not a sufficient incentive for 
the supplier to make first-best investment decisions. The following section focuses on a variety of 
other contractual solutions.  
5.2  Contractual solutions to the holdup problem 
Rogerson (1992) sums up the holdup literature, and presents a set of assumptions under which first-
best solutions can be found even in the dynamic contracting setting. He follows e.g. Hart and Moore 
(1988) in listing the three main conclusions of the holdup literature. First, the absence of any 
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contract is likely to lead to underinvestment. Second, even simple contracts can lead to complicated 
outcomes, if the contract is viewed as affecting subsequent bargaining rather than as a complete 
description of the outcome. Third, even in simple environments optimal contract can still result in 
inefficient investment, if a fixed renegotiation game is present. 
This section discusses a few articles regarding contractual solutions to the holdup problem in the 
context procurement contracting. The first subsection presents a model by Che and Sákovics (2004) 
discussing the importance of patience in solving holdup problems. The second subsection considers 
cooperative investments as opposed to purely selfish investments (Che and Hausch (1999). The 
third subsection describes how a holdup situation can be created by reputation building (Lewis, 
1986). Finally, the fourth subsection introduces a model where holdups can be prevented via a 
simple option contract (Nöldeke & Schmidt, 1995; Nöldeke & Schmidt, 1998).      
5.2.1  Patience 
Che and Sákovics (2004) present a model that allows risk-neutral parties to continue invest until 
they agree on the terms of trade. The model suggests that a holdup situation, created by 
relationship-specific investments, do not need to entail underinvestment. In the model, ex-post 
negotiation allows for the contracting parties to split the ex-post trading surplus. From this it 
follows that an investor is able to appropriate only half of the marginal return to his investment, 
which in turn leads to underinvestment. Che and Sákovics study the effect of patience and present a 
model, where investment dynamics alone can solve the incentive problem, paying particular 
attention to the individual rationality constraint (p. 5-7, 2004). In the simplified model the supplier 
faces a binary choice: to invest or not to invest. Investment costs him    . The gross surplus from 
the trade is    if he invests and    if he does not invest. Assume that it is always efficient to invest, 
       . The parties have equal bargaining power: each party becomes the proposer of trade 
with equal probability. In a static model, the supplier would not invest if 
 
 
     
 
 
    
In a dynamic version of the model, where sequential investment is allowed, there exists an 
equilibrium in which the supplier invests if the parties' common discount factor   is sufficiently 
close to 1 and the investment is individually rational for the supplier: 
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If the supplier now chooses to invest, the trade results in a standard bargaining game with a fixed 
surplus, and in the equilibrium the parties will on average split    equally. Hence, the supplier's 
equilibrium payoff will be 
 
 
    , just as in the static case, i.e., the supplier would be held up in 
terms of the absolute payoff in both the dynamic and the static model. If the supplier deviates and 
chooses not to invest in period 1, he will invest in period 2, given a one-period deviation possibility. 
Therefore, the buyer's continuation payoff following supplier's first-period deviation is  .
 
 
  /. 
Thus the buyer never agrees to trade unless he receives at least this amount. The supplier's payoff 
from choosing not to invest in the first period is thus    {     .
 
 
  /   .
 
 
    /}. The 
former payoff is received if the supplier offers  .
 
 
  /; the latter if the offered amount is lower, 
which the buyer rejects, or if the buyer becomes the proposer, in which case he would offer the 
supplier's net continuation value,  .
 
 
    /. For    , both payoffs are less than 
 
 
    , i.e. 
the payoff the supplier would receive by investing in the first period. Therefore one-period 
deviation is not profitable, it is in the supplier's interest to invest, when   is sufficiently close to 1. 
Thus the mere possibility of adding investment later can create an additional investment incentive 
compared to the static model, as long the individual rationality constraint is present.  
The result of the above-described model is rather intuitive: if the contracting parties are indifferent 
between investing now and investing later, it is easy for the principal to induce the agent to invest 
already in the first period since one-period deviation is not profitable to the supplier. The threat of 
the buyer becoming the proposer is a sufficient incentive for the supplier to invest as soon as 
possible if the discount factors tend to one. 
5.2.2  Cooperative investments 
Che and Hausch (1999) challenge the incomplete contract – holdup -paradigm by arguing that a 
simple contract can solve the holdup problem by achieving an efficient outcome. Most holdup 
literature assumes that the supplier invests to reduce his cost, and the buyer invests to increase his 
benefit. This is called selfish investment. Instead, the focus of Che and Hausch lies within 
cooperative investment that generates direct benefit to the trading partner. A cooperative investment 
can be either pure in the sense that it offers no benefits to the investors, or it can be hybrid in the 
sense that it offers direct benefits to both trading partners. In practice, e.g. quality-enhancing R&D 
or enhancing the working conditions of the trading partner can be seen as cooperative investments. 
Contractual incompleteness results in the threat of holdup with both selfish and cooperative 
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investments. As a first result, Che and Hausch show that regardless the degree of cooperativeness, 
efficiency can be achieved if the parties can commit not to renegotiate. However, since such a 
commitment is impossible to execute in complex procurement contracting, the results of a model 
that accounts for renegotiation are of more importance. The second result is obtained when 
bargaining shares are exogenously determined. In the presence of renegotiation, it is shown that if 
investments are sufficiently cooperative, there exists a range of bargaining shares for which 
contracting brings no additional value over ex-post negotiation. As the investments tend towards 
pure cooperativeness, the range of worthless ex-ante contracting covers the full range of bargaining 
shares. The findings revolve around the efficient bargaining shares. A cooperative investment 
worsens the investor's status quo position by improving the trading partner's status quo position. 
The party with a smaller bargaining share is more sensitive to a change in his status quo position, 
and less sensitive to his partner's status quo position. Thus a cooperative investment has less 
adverse effect on the behavior of the investing party with a smaller bargaining share. It is therefore 
stated that the first-best outcome may be attainable when the investing party has least bargaining 
power (Che & Hausch, 1999).  
The findings of Che and Hausch (1999) yield interesting implications. The ability to avoid 
renegotiation is identified as an important condition for achieving efficiency. Since such ability 
cannot be legally enforced in interfirm trade, it offers some perspective on the theory of 
organization. Two examples are identified. First, the insight gives strong support to intrafirm trade 
resulting from vertical integration: commitment not to renegotiate and thus erode surplus from 
cooperative investment is more easily supported within the firm. Second, some remarks can also be 
drawn about the judicial attitude towards enforcing nonmodification clauses in interfirm 
contracting. Courts are reluctant to enforce commitment not to renegotiate, even though 
nonmodification clauses are likely to enhance efficiency in trades where cooperative investments 
are important. Therefore the implications are of significance only in the case the contracting parties 
can credibly commit to a voluntary non-renegotiation clause. As for the second result of Che and 
Hausch, the effect of the bargaining shares is of little practical importance. As stated above, 
bargaining shares are exogenously determined, and therefore the less powerful party is 
automatically induced to invest.  
5.2.3  Reputation building 
Lewis (1986) discusses reputation and contractual performance in long-term projects. A long-term 
relationship is modeled as a sequential game to which neither of the parties can credibly commit. It 
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is argued that the contractors typically work hard in the initial phase to keep costs down until both 
parties are locked into finalizing the project. Lewis distinguishes four attributes of long-term 
projects. First, the procurement occurs over an extended period. Second, the projects involve 
untried technologies. Third, the market for such projects is naturally thin which constitutes for the 
lack of outside options. Finally, costs are incurred throughout the process whereas benefits only 
accrue once the project is finalized. These features are similar to the nuclear power market. 
Contractual incompleteness stands as a starting point of the analysis. Lewis (1986) justifies both 
contractual incompleteness and the high probability of renegotiation with these attributes. First, the 
extended period of contracting renders writing complete contracts impossible. Second, the lack of 
outside options combined with the delayed benefits from the project creates a holdup situation 
which is likely to lead to the renegotiation of the contract. 
Lewis (1986, p. 142) describes a holdup problem as the main goal of an agent's initially good 
performance. In the model i is the number of tasks left to complete the project. The cost history of a 
project up to period i is summarized by a reputation value for the project, denoted by    ,   -. In 
equilibrium there exists a sequence of acceptable reputation levels   
  such that the project is 
cancelled in period i unless      
 . This implies that the project is continued for one more task, if 
the benefits yet to be received exceed the perceived future costs to the principal. Lewis (1986) 
shows that the acceptable reputation levels are strictly declining as the number of task left decreases 
to some period d, where   
    for all    . Therefore at period d the principal is locked in, i.e. 
committed to finish the procurement process because the benefits from the project exceed even the 
largest possible costs remaining to be incurred. Similarly, it is shown that the expected cost of 
completing each task increases as the project nears completion. Even though the threat of 
cancellation directs the agent's effort in the earlier stages of a project, the incidence of project 
terminations may be negligible. It is shown that efficient firms will always produce at low cost, so 
that cancellations actually never occur. In this instance, the efficient agent's investment in his 
reputation prevents the principal from cancelling the project until he is fully committed to finishing 
the project at any possible cost.  
This model by Lewis (1986) presented above forms a plausible framework for holdups within 
nuclear construction. The model is actually surprisingly well-suited for the Fennovoima case: the 
contracting process consists of a sequence of contracts, beginning with an early works agreement, 
moving on to a front-end engineering design contract and ending up with an engineering, 
procurement and construction contract. Moreover, the relative weight of the contracts increases 
logarithmically. It would thus be relatively easy to the supplier to create a holdup situation with a 
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relatively insignificant initial investment. The model resonates with the adverse selection models 
presented in chapter 3: sequential contracting opens an avenue for a signaling game, which can 
potentially end up harming the principal, when sequential contracting is introduced into the model. 
As a result, the two parties of the contract are locked into each other, greatly reducing the appeal of 
an outside option, i.e. contracting with another supplier or withdrawing from the project. Outside 
competition has little impact on the relationship, which implies that the contracting parties are likely 
to enter renegotiation.  
5.2.4  Option contracts 
Option contracts are theoretically a very powerful tool in aligning the incentives of the two 
contracting parties and thus to fully relieve the principal from the fear of moral hazard. Option 
contracts are also identified by Bolton and Dewatripont as a tool of pushing the best-response 
relationship-specific investment curves toward the first-best equilibrium (see Figure 3: 
Underinvestment with holdup problem ). Schmidt (2001) suggests other than simple governance 
structures as a means of mitigating the underinvestment-problem, created by a holdup situation. He 
refers to e.g. Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995), who consider a simple solution to the holdup problem. 
Nöldeke and Schmidt argue that the underinvestment problem can be overcome with a simple 
option contract. An option contract gives the supplier the right – not an obligation – to deliver a 
fixed quantity of the good, and makes the buyer's payment contingent on the delivery decision. 
Option contract is feasible only if it is possible to enforce payments conditional on the supplier's 
delivery decision, i.e. if it is verifiable by a court whether it is due to the supplier’s refusal to deliver 
or the buyer’s refusal to take delivery that the trade did not take place. This condition is sufficient 
for efficient investment decisions to be made and to assume the holdup problem away. 
Unfortunately, the simple form of an option contract can hardly be enforced in the context of 
nuclear reactor procurement. The regulatory uncertainty faced by the supplier ensures that the 
supplier has already made sunken investments and is no longer indifferent between “taking 
delivery” and “refusing delivery”.   
Nöldeke and Schmidt (1998) consider also a more sophisticated holdup problem where the two 
contracting parties make sequential relationship-specific investments. The basic assumption is that 
the only long-term contracts that can be written concern ownership rights, and that efficient 
investment decisions cannot be contractually forced. Moreover, it is noted that technological 
progress and regulatory changes make it increasingly difficult to write a complete contingent 
contract on the required investments. In the model, the first-best investment level is achieved 
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through an option-to-own contract. Instead of a conventional ownership structure, they suggest that 
firm A could own the company initially, but firm B is given the option to buy the firm at a 
predetermined price at some later date. Nöldeke and Schmidt present a set of conditions under 
which this could be sufficient to induce both parties make efficient sequential investments. In the 
Fennovoima case, the setting can be interpreted so that the reactor supplier owns the venture 
initially, and has to make an investment in country-specific reactor design. The more the reactor 
supplier invests, the higher Fennovoima's valuation; Fennovoima will exercise the option-to-own 
only if the initial investment is sufficiently high. If the option price is chosen appropriately, 
Fennovoima will buy the venture if and only if the supplier invested the efficient amount. The 
supplier is thus induced to invest at least the efficient amount, because if Fennovoima does not 
exercise the option, its investment incentives are similarly diluted, and the venture is not worth 
much to the supplier. Moreover, the supplier will not overinvest either, because Fennovoima will 
reap most of the marginal benefits. Finally, it is assumed that Fennovoima-ownership is a sufficient 
incentive to induce Fennovoima to invest efficiently. 
5.3  General remarks about holdups 
When dynamics is introduced into the contracting phase, a holdup situation becomes a relevant risk. 
Theoretically, a holdup is simple to understand: why should the supplier invest more if the thus 
created additional surplus flows to the buyer? Even if the ex-post surplus were to be equally divided 
between the contracting parties, the incentive to invest the socially optimal amount may not be 
sufficient. 
In the nuclear reactor procurement setting the situation is somewhat different. The combined 
investment of the two contracting parties must result in a plant that is licensable and can be 
connected to the commercial grid. Any output level below this yields a negative payoff. However, 
the parties can greatly increase their net present value from the project the sooner it is completed. 
Therefore the supplier and the buyer optimally reach a contract that not only defines bid price and 
the risk sharing structure, but also equates the marginal costs of accelerated project execution with 
the marginal benefit from it. The contract must also allot a sufficient proportion of the additional 
ex-post payoff to the supplier so as to compensate for his investment.    
In general, option contracts seem to offer a remedy to the holdup–underinvestment problem. An 
option to own would ensure the efficient investment by the original owner, so that he would 
maximize the value of his ownership by the time the trade takes place. Other kinds of option 
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arrangements are worth considering and possibly more easily feasible in the industry context, as 
long as the additional surplus for the supplier equates his additional investment. For instance, the 
option contract for the procurement project at hand could be designed so as to incentivize the 
supplier for timely project completion. This could be achieved by granting the supplier a fixed 
proportion of the net income generated within the target schedule. If the commercial use of the plant 
is delayed, net income and thus the additional compensation falls to zero. 
6  Renegotiation 
In a long-term project, the contracting parties are likely to modify the contract at some point. 
Renegotiation may take place if the contracting environment or the design of the product has 
changed so that pareto-improvements can be made through revised contract design. The fact that a 
contractual relation is enduring of nature has fundamental consequences on the effects of 
asymmetric information and the incentives for an optimal outcome. For instance, in the early stages 
of a relationship, the agent may hold back on revealing information that could be used against him 
in later stages of the relationship. Alternatively, the agent may engage in reputation building in 
order to convince the principal into committing to a long-term relationship. Moreover, unforeseen 
contingencies introduce an additional challenge into the dynamic setting of renegotiation. Repeated 
interaction complicates the incentive schemes, but also allows for more refined contractual 
responses. 
For instance, the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority reassessed some of their safety 
requirements in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident. This introduced exogenous changes into 
the ongoing construction of Olkiluoto 3, as well as the specifications of the Fennovoima bidding 
process. Similarly, unspecified design issues have propelled the contracting parties of Olkiluoto 3 
into an extensive litigation process over the non-contracted requirements. It is justified to state that 
the contracting parties are likely to enter into renegotiation at some stage of the contracted period. 
As a matter of fact, in risky long-term projects renegotiation can be considered as an industry 
practice, rather than a deviation from the normal contracting procedure. 
This chapter provides an overview on dynamic contracting, discussing how changing circumstances 
and contractual incompleteness induce the contracting parties to renegotiate in order to achieve an 
optimal outcome. The chapter consists of three sections. The first section presents a simple model 
of renegotiation. The second section discusses contractual incompleteness, which is identified as a 
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main reason for the need of renegotiation. Finally, the third section focuses on renegotiation 
literature, discussing some important considerations. This section sheds light on the third research 
question: How to ensure the optimal outcome in case of renegotiation? In all, this chapter highlights 
how adding dynamics to the static contracting model increases the complexity of the contracting 
setting. Unlike the first two themes of this thesis – bidding and contracting – the dynamic theory of 
contracting is based on fairly recent research. Therefore, there exists no canonical framework for 
reviewing the topic, and much of the material in this section and its presentation has been 
synthesized for the purposes of this thesis.      
6.1  Renegotiation design: A simple model 
Renegotiation takes place when the ex-ante contract no longer yields an optimal outcome. In a 
model by Bolton and Dewatripont (2004, pp. 565–566), the contracting parties enter in pareto-
improving renegotiations after the changing contingencies have induced underinvestment. They 
present a model of simple renegotiation design for specific-performance contracts. The notation 
follows that of the simple holdup model presented in section 5.1   
The two contracting parties bargain in the absence of contract, beginning at date   when the state of 
the world   has been observed. They bargain about the terms of trade in an alternating-offer 
bargaining game. In state  (     ) there is a unique equilibrium for any pair of discount factors 
     for the buyer and      for the supplier. When it is the buyer’s turn to make an offer  
 , 
he solves 
      such that           ( 
    ) 
Similarly, when it is the supplier’s turn to make an offer   , he solves 
      such that     
    (    
 ) 
At the optimum these inequalities are binding, and yield a unique outcome. If the supplier makes 
the first offer, the price is 
   
    
      
     
    
      
   
If instead the buyer makes the first offer, the price is 
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Since      , the price offered by the buyer is lower than the price offered by the supplier. If, 
however, both discount factors tend to 1, then both prices tend to (     )  , so that gains from 
trade are shared equally. If one party becomes very patient relative to the other (    , while    is 
bounded away from 1), he obtains the entire surplus from trade.  
6.1.1  Equilibrium renegotiation 
The above-presented model described the contract as a result of a bargaining game. In order to 
assess its impact on the bargaining game, Bolton and Dewatripont (2004, pp. 565–566) present a 
contract that specifies default options (  ̃  ̃) that each party can enforce when it is his turn to react 
to the offer by the other party. As a reaction to an offer, the parties can either accept the offer; wait 
one period to make a counteroffer or request for their default options. This turns the bargaining 
game into an alternating-offer game with an outside option. According to the outside-option 
principle, the parties payoffs associated with the outside option are (   ̃   ̃). The parties ex-post 
efficient payoffs without the outside option then are (  
    
 ). If (  
    
 ) pareto-dominates 
(   ̃   ̃), the equilibrium payoffs are (  
    
 ). If (  
    
 ) does not pareto-dominate (   ̃   ̃), the 
outcome of the game is ex-post efficient and gives party   for whom   ̃    
  his outside option 
payoff.  
In order to limit the supplier to his default-option payoff, this payoff has to be higher than the 
outcome of bargaining without the default option. This outcome is ensured with a penalty for 
delayed trade that the supplier pays to the buyer. If the penalty is high enough, the supplier 
immediately accepts any offer (   ) that is better for him than (  ̃  ̃), in order to avoid delay. the 
first-best contract can thus be implemented through a relatively simple contract. This simplicity is 
achieved as the contract form allows for equilibrium renegotiation.  
MacLeod and Malcomson (2001) formalize renegotiation by a bargaining game. The four possible 
outcomes for the contracting parties are: trade with each other under the terms of original contract, 
no trade at all, trading with outside options, and renegotiation. The continuation of the relationship, 
i.e. the first and the last options, requires both parties to agree on the same contract. Breaching the 
contract, i.e. the second and the third options, may involve breach penalties. According to MacLeod 
and Malcomson (2001, p. 812), if a contract is renegotiated when the original terms make one party 
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prefer either not trading at all or outside option over trade, the joint gain from renegotiation must be 
shared between the contracting parties. The parties share the surplus as long as neither could do 
better by choosing the outside option. If investments were general, the marginal return for the 
contracting parties would be same regardless the partners. However, since the topic of this thesis is 
procurement contracting for a nuclear power plant, a field with highly specialized design, the focus 
remains on relationship-specific investments. In this case, the switching costs incurred by breaching 
the contract erode the marginal return, as the original relationship-specific investment is useless. 
Relationship-specific investments are valuable for trade only with the chosen partner. The return 
from this relationship-specific investment is then shared between the contracting parties, 
contributing to a holdup situation (further discussed in chapter 5  Whenever renegotiation occurs, 
the parties will not receive full marginal return on investments. Therefore, when both parties 
commit to a project through relationship-specific investments, an optimal contract is conditioned on 
sufficient external variables in order to ensure that renegotiation does not occur.  
6.2  Incomplete contracts 
This section explores incomplete contracts and how contractual incompleteness can affect the 
renegotiation setting in procurement contracting. It is widely agreed that bilateral contracts, 
especially in complex projects, tend to be incomplete (e.g. Hart & Moore, 1988; Bajari & Tadelis, 
2001; Wernerfelt, 2004). Decision-making is a burdensome task, and it might be the easiest to leave 
trivial decisions out of a contract. Moreover, not all contingencies can be accounted for, and 
therefore writing a more complete contract incurs an increasing marginal cost tending to infinity. 
However, the difficulty of formalizing the costs of writing a contingent contract limits the practical 
applications of research on contractual incompleteness.  
This section consists of two subchapters presenting models about contractual incompleteness. The 
first subchapter presents a model by Crocker and Reynolds (1993). They assess the optimal degree 
of contractual incompleteness, and state that a contract is the most efficient when intentionally left 
incomplete. The second subchapter, in turn, discusses contractual incompleteness as a means of 
signaling. Spier (1993) presents a model where the principal can use contractual incompleteness as 
a means of capitalizing on his superior information about his type. 
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6.2.1  Optimal degree of contractual incompleteness 
Multiple articles demonstrate that a simple long-term contract can actually induce first-best 
investments in various contexts, even without achieving completion in describing the possible 
future contingencies. For example, Crocker and Reynolds (1993, p.128) present a model that 
defines the degree to which the potential contingencies are optimally covered by the contract. They 
represent the degree of contractual completeness as the selection of a parameter   ,   - which 
denotes the probability that a contingency not expressly covered by the agreement may arise during 
the project. If all contingencies are covered by the contract, then     and there is no room for ex-
post bargaining. The other extremity,    , places no limitations on the terms under which 
subsequent trade may be effected. Intermediate degrees of completeness,      , specify duties 
for the more easily anticipated contingencies, leaving the other possibilities to future resolution as 
events and changing requirements unfold. 
According to the model by Crocker and Reynolds (1993), the chosen degree of specificity reflects 
an efficient tradeoff between the expected costs and benefits of contractual incompleteness. The 
model reflects the procurement contracting setting of this thesis, assuming a fairly complex 
contracting environment and a long-term contract, which renders the drafting of a complete contract 
rather impossible, or at least excessively costly. The model by Crocker and Reynolds follows e.g. 
Hart and Moore (1988) and Spier (1992) in assuming that contractual incompleteness is mostly due 
to the excessive cost of both defining all the relevant contingencies and negotiating mutually 
acceptable responses to all these contingencies. Therefore, if environmental complexity is held 
constant, which corresponds to the reality, the marginal cost of implementing more precise 
agreements is increasing in the degree of contractual completeness,    , and in the level of 
environmental and regulatory uncertainty, ω. Crocker and Reynolds (1993) assume that 
environmental uncertainty is increasing in the duration of a relationship. Therefore contractual 
completeness should decrease for longer project durations, as defining precise contracts for long-
term relationships is costly and inefficient.  
According to Crocker and Reynolds (1993, p. 129) a more complete contract reduces a party’s 
ability to engage in effort to effect privately favorable distributions of the ex-post contractual 
surplus, which speaks on behalf of contractual completeness. On the contrary, a less complete 
contract creates two possible forms of additional costs. First, incompleteness leads to ex-post 
renegotiation costs as the contingencies unfold – the repeated bargaining process consumes 
resources. Second, the possibility of renegotiation raised by contractual incompleteness generates 
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potential inefficiencies by discouraging ex-ante investment. Inefficient ex-ante investment levels 
and underinvestment are further explored in subsection 5.1 . As the parties are unable to commit to 
an enforceable division of the contractual surplus in all future states, the investor recognizes that a 
part of the benefits from his effort may be reaped by the other party as a consequence of future 
renegotiation. Therefore, the marginal benefit of contractual completeness in this model contributes 
to a reduction in investment externality, which is positively related to the likelihood of opportunistic 
behavior L. The marginal benefit from contractual completeness is thus a decreasing function of 
contractual completeness. At the time of the first round of contractual negotiations, the principal 
and the agent have expectations about ω and L; regulatory uncertainty and the likelihood of ex-post 
opportunism, respectively. The efficient level of contractual incompleteness equates the marginal 
costs and marginal benefits of contracting (Figure 4: Optimal degree of contractual completeness ), 
depending on both environmental and regulatory uncertainty ω and the likelihood of ex-post 
opportunism L. (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993) 
                      
Figure 4: Optimal degree of contractual completeness  
The model comprises two opposing forces. First, increasing environmental complexity shifts the 
marginal cost of contracting upward, resulting in lesser contractual completeness. Second, the 
increasing likelihood of opportunistic behavior shifts the marginal benefit of contracting upward, 
which makes increased contractual completeness attractive. Crocker and Reynolds (1993, p. 138–
145) test the model with a panel dataset consisting of jet engine procurement contracts. They find 
the use of less structured contracts, and thus contract renegotiation, to be extensive, particularly 
when the performance horizon is remote. However, the procurement contracts have become 
substantially more complete over time – when the technology becomes more familiar, it seems 
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reasonable to assume that a contract can attain a higher level of completeness without demanding 
any additional effort from the contracting parties. Interestingly, Crocker and Reynolds (1993, 
p.144), identify a systematic difference in the degree of completeness in contracts with two different 
contractors.  The number of past disputes with the contractors is identified as a significant 
explanatory variable. It is assumed that the past willingness to engage in litigation reflects some 
static features of corporate culture and thus correlates with future opportunism. Therefore the 
number of past disputes can be seen to correlate positively with the marginal benefits of more 
complete contracts, reflecting higher costs of contracting, thus shifting the MC curve to the left and 
the equilibrium towards contractual completeness. 
The more complete the ex-ante design of a contract is, the lower the likelihood that the parties will 
need to renegotiate ex-post changes (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001). A more complete ex-ante design 
imposer higher ex-ante costs on the principal. Thus the chosen degree of contractual completeness 
is a tradeoff between contracting costs and renegotiation costs. The marginal cost of contractual 
completeness is increasing, implying that in a complex project even the most comprehensive 
contract falls short from covering all possible contingencies. 
6.2.2  Asymmetric information and incomplete contracts 
Spier (1992) identifies three reasons for contractual incompleteness. First, it is commonly agreed 
that the cost of contracting on an unlikely contingency may easily outweigh the benefits. Second 
commonly used justification for contractual incompleteness is bounded rationality. This refers to 
agent's and principal's limited ability to foresee and evaluate elaborate contingencies, i.e. to predict 
the realization of the random variable affecting the outcome of the bilateral contract. Spier identifies 
asymmetric information as the third reason for contractual incompleteness. A contracting party 
might be unwilling to include a particular clause in a contract, which acts as a signal of his type. 
This implies that when asymmetric information is present, the contract may be incomplete or overly 
simple. A model by Spier (1992) focuses on asymmetric information as a driver for contractual 
incompleteness. In particular, contractual incompleteness can act as a sign of agent's type, when 
transaction costs are present.  
Spier (1992) presents a model with a risk-averse principal and a risk-neutral agent. The principal 
hires the agent to manage a stochastic technology. The principal is one of two types: good or bad. 
The good type has higher expected payoff from the technology, and would naturally prefer the 
agent to carry the risk of production. Therefore the principal would prefer a profit sharing contract, 
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where the agent's wage is higher when the profits are high, and lower when the profits are low. The 
principal is more likely to offer an incomplete contract when asymmetric information is present. 
Transaction costs are divided into two classes: drafting costs which are incurred ex ante, and 
verification costs which are incurred ex post. Asymmetric information reduces the benefits of 
complete contracts without altering the incurred costs. When transaction costs – ex-ante or ex-post 
– are negligible, the good type of principal signals his type through a complete contract that gives 
less insurance, since drafting and verifying a complete contract does not incur significant costs. 
When transaction costs are large, and drafting and verifying a complete contract would incur greater 
costs, the principal chooses to signal his type through an incomplete contract. The intuition goes as 
follows. The agent’s payoff is considered to be independent of the principal’s type within the class 
of incomplete contracts. Therefore signaling their concerns make more complete contracts more 
costly to the good type of principal. Since the good type of principal is unlikely to end up in 
disputes, the principal is likely to choose the less expensive option and draft an incomplete contract. 
The reputation of the contracting parties is discussed in subsection 4.2.2 As stated, the one shot 
nature of the Fennovoima project might render it useless to the company to behave as a principal of 
the good type, if it is less costly to shirk. The supplier being aware of this, it is of no use to the 
company to signal its type through the degree of contractual incompleteness. 
In the signaling model, Spier (1992) distinguishes three cases. In the first case, the transaction costs 
are small, and both types of principal offer complete contracts. In the second case, the transaction 
costs are large, and both types of principal offer incomplete contracts. Finally, there is a signaling 
equilibrium between these two cases, where the good type of principal offers an incomplete contract 
and the bad type of principal offers a complete contract. Therefore, the good type of principal may 
be willing to leave a contract incomplete in order to credibly signal his type to the agent. As a 
continuation to this, the more complex the contract, the more likely the parties are to end up in 
costly litigation process about the wage.  
Even though Spier (1992) provides valuable insight into the strategic choices of the principal, the 
model lefts out important considerations about the agent’s type. The model suggests that the good 
type of principal is better off offering an incomplete contract. This model about the effects of 
informational asymmetry on the contractual completeness focuses on the signaling choice the 
principal can make. In the Fennovoima project, however, there is hardly any room for strategic 
speculations. The supplier candidates are aware of the principal's position as a project company, and 
therefore it might be unnecessary for Fennovoima to enter in signaling games at any cost. 
Contractual incompleteness might still be efficient, but it has to be justified by other means. 
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6.3  Topics in renegotiation literature 
This section discusses a few articles regarding renegotiation in procurement contracting. The first 
subsection presents a model that allows for interim renegotiation before the output is realized 
(Fudenberg & Tirole, 1990). The second subsection, in turn, discusses how renegotiation design can 
be contracted upon already in the ex-ante contract in order to achieve the pareto-optimal outcome 
(Hart & Moore, 1988; Aghion et al., 1994) and how ceding decision rights to the other contracting 
party can lead to efficiency (Wernerfelt, 2004). Finally, the third subsection discusses renegotiation 
in a complex environment and its effect on the choice of the risk-sharing rate (Bajari & Tadelis, 
2001). 
6.3.1  Interim renegotiation 
The standard moral hazard model (see section 4.1 ) assumed that the contracting parties commit to a 
contract, which cannot be renegotiated in later stages. In contrast, e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) 
present a model where the principal and the agent are able to renegotiate between the agent’s choice 
of effort level and the observation of the outcome. This is a credible assumption, especially in cases 
where there are long lags between the agent’s choice of effort level and the time the consequences 
of this choice are revealed. Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) discuss a case where the outcome is only 
seen five years after the agent has exerted his effort. The standard model then suggests that the 
agent’s compensation should depend on the outcomes that to be observed five years hence. 
However, as the agent is the only one to know the chosen effort level, for the intervening years he 
holds private information on the probability distribution of future outcomes. This extended period 
of informational asymmetry opens a space for voluntary renegotiation. If the principal chooses not 
to alter the contract during the renegotiation stage, the contract can be called to be renegotiation-
proof. If the principal could observe the effort level chosen by the agent, they would renegotiate the 
initial imperfect insurance contract and change it to a perfect insurance contract. However, if the 
agent anticipates renegotiation, he would exert less effort, and the outcome would remain 
inefficient. Therefore the optimal renegotiation-proof contract is such that the agent randomizes 
over his effort level in order to keep the principal guessing and thus eliminating some gains from 
renegotiation. As a result, renegotiation yields an undersupply of effort compared to a full-
commitment contract. 
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6.3.2  Contracting for renegotiation 
Hart and Moore (1988) assume a model that always allows for renegotiation. They state that it is in 
the interest of both parties to try to constrain the outcome of the renegotiation process already in the 
original contract. This implies that a revision game is already designed in the original contract. The 
analysis provides conditions for a contract mechanism that can be built into the original contract in 
order to renegotiate the contract, as the parties grow more aware of their benefits and costs. It is 
shown that the divisions of the ex-post surplus are very sensitive to the communication mechanism 
and to the potential verifiability of the messages the parties send to each other during the 
renegotiation stage. Similarly, it is shown that when the parties are risk neutral, efficient investment 
levels that would ensure a pareto optimal outcome cannot be achieved even through verifiable 
messaging. However, if the parties are risk neutral and the trade does not involve relationship-
specific investments, then it would be possible to achieve a pareto optimal outcome with verifiable 
messaging. However, messages, in general, are unverifiable by a third party, despite being ex-post 
observable by the two contracting parties. Since trade is assumed to be voluntary, it takes place at 
the renegotiation stage only if both parties agree to trade ex-post. Courts cannot observe who did 
not want to trade in case trade does not take place.  
Aghion et al. (1994) develop the ideas of Hart and Moore (1988) further. They argue that 
unverifiability of renegotiation messages, as described above, is not sufficient to explain 
underinvestment. However, they demonstrate that the issue of underinvestment can be solved 
through adequate contractual renegotiation design, which stands in contract with the 
underinvestment findings of Hart and Moore. Hart and Moore emphasize the unverifiability of 
messaging, assuming that courts cannot enforce contractually specified levels of trade, so that in the 
renegotiation phase the only default option is abandoning trade. Aghion et al., instead, attain 
efficiency at renegotiation phase by assigning all bargaining power to one party. To circumvent the 
unverifiability problem, the parties can include a revelation mechanism in the initial contract. This 
is possible since the model assumes that the court is able to verify that each party did their part of 
the trade. If the revelation mechanism is adequate, it can induce the contracting parties to choose 
first-best investments leading to a pareto-efficient outcome.   
Wernerfelt (2004), in turn, presents a renegotiation mechanism that leads to choosing the 
investment alternative that would have been picked by a joint decision making process. If a 
unilaterally made decision is renegotiated before implementation, the initially uninvolved party 
incurs the decision-making cost. Renegotiation pays off depending on this cost and the additional 
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surplus incurred by renegotiation. Consequently, the informed party, i.e. the original decision 
maker, can prevent renegotiation by rendering the joint decision just costly enough for the other 
party to leave it. Thus the threat of costly renegotiation allows for unilateral decisions reducing the 
cost of contractual incompleteness. As long as decision-making costs are worth saving, all 
renegotiation can be avoided, even with very incomplete contracts. 
Wernerfelt (2004) proves that when renegotiation is impossible, the contracting parties are more 
likely to cede decision power to each other.  However, this requires that the relative importance is 
low, the initial level of information is low, decision-making is costly and there is little difference of 
opinion about the decision. Thus the parties are likely to gain decision rights if they have better 
information about it. The cost of incompleteness, when renegotiation is impossible, is that the 
preferences of the uninvolved party are ignored. If the parties are able to make less selfish decision, 
i.e. to agree on a shared goal, the outcome becomes pareto-optimal. As the can be seen in 
Wernerfelt's model, aligning the parties' goals can allow for an improved outcome. The implications 
of the findings to the Fennovoima case are straightforward and rather intuitive: if the goals of the 
two contracting parties are aligned, the parties can bear with less decision rights over the contracted 
items. More incompleteness can be allowed, thus incurring savings on contracting and renegotiation 
costs.  
When renegotiation is possible, which is likely in a complex project, it is considered to be costless 
for the party who makes the decisions (Wernerfelt, 2004). It is shown that when renegotiation is 
possible, the contracting parties are likely to cede decision rights if the difference between 
renegotiation costs and decision costs is low enough. If renegotiation is as cheap as decision-
making, the threat of renegotiation allows for maximally incomplete contracts. However, the 
implications to the Fennovoima case are not quite clear. With an increasing project complexity, the 
cost of renegotiation is likely to be high. It seems intuitive, that only perfectly aligned goals could 
allow for a maximally incomplete contract and thus contribute to a reduction in the cost of 
contracting.  
6.3.3  Renegotiation and risk-sharing 
On the risk sharing scale, renegotiation is associated only with fixed-price contracts (Bajari and 
Tadelis, 2001). The right to renegotiate is not part of a cost-plus contract – instead, a cost-plus 
contract offers the agent initial flexibility by always guaranteeing the outside option of zero value. 
Hence this section explores only renegotiation of cost-plus contracts. The binary choice between a 
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fixed-price contract and a cost-plus contract is, of course, an extreme occurrence of risk sharing. 
However, as Bajari and Tadelis (2001) argue, these extreme cases do provide sufficient insight into 
the renegotiation game. According to the model, the complexity of a project has actually an 
ambiguous effect on the likelihood of renegotiation. First, if a product is less complete by design, 
the contract is likely to be of a cost-plus form, in which case renegotiation does not occur. In 
contrast, if the complexity of the project has not been taken into account in the contracting phase, a 
more complex project is likely to incur renegotiations as the product design shows insufficient. This 
tradeoff could be dissipated through a more complete design. However, this comes at an increasing 
marginal cost implying that the more complete the contract is, the more costly it becomes to further 
specify the design. Following this logic, choosing a fixed-price contract as presented by Bajari and 
Tadelis (2001) brings about a tradeoff between specifying the design at an increasing cost and 
facing costly renegotiations.  
Bajari and Tadelis (2001) suggest that with a fixed-price contract it is beneficial to specify the 
design further if friction increases. This may render renegotiation unnecessary and mitigate ex-post 
cost from renegotiating the contract. Consequently, with a cost-plus contract the optimal action is to 
hold on to a cost-plus contract. However, sufficient friction may cause the contracting parties to 
shift from a fixed-price contract to a cost-plus contract, since a cost-plus contract does not 
necessarily even require any renegotiation in order to be modified. If renegotiation is anticipated, 
and the contracting environment is complex enough, a cost-plus contract might thus turn out to be 
the most cost-efficient form of contracting.  
6.4  General remarks about renegotiation 
Renegotiation is likely to occur at some point of a risky long-term project. The contracting 
environment, or the design, can evolve over time such that a better outcome can be obtained if the 
original contract is revised. The renegotiation can be facilitated with an appropriate choice of 
contract structure: a simple cost-plus contract is fully flexible. In contrast, if the original contract is 
complex and of fixed-price form, the renegotiation costs are likely to be high. Revising the contract 
can be fully avoided only if the renegotiation costs are sufficiently high.  
Theoretically, the outcome from a renegotiated contract can approach the equilibrium if the ex-post 
surplus is divided between the contracting parties in relation to their negotiation power. However, 
as seen in the previous chapter, this approach leads to underinvestment, when the investments are 
project-specific.  
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Another issue discussed in this chapter is contractual incompleteness. Since writing a fully 
contingent contract is extremely costly, incompleteness might actually be intentional. However, a 
complete contract would render renegotiation unnecessary. If contracting is sequential, then it is 
possible for the contracting parties to begin with incomplete contracts, and then gradually move 
towards a more complete form if friction arises. The contractual incompleteness, delayed benefits 
from the project and the lack of outside options create a holdup situation, which is likely to lead to 
the renegotiation of the contract. 
In all, renegotiation literature is rather descriptive: the focus lies on the characteristics of the 
contracting parties or on how renegotiation can be avoided altogether. Since it is impossible to rule 
out renegotiation altogether, it might be worthwhile to limit the outcome from renegotiation already 
in the original contract. The contract design can also be used as a tool of mitigating friction in the 
renegotiation process, assuming that both parties have agreed to predetermine the renegotiation 
process. 
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7  Conclusions and practical implications 
Customarily, the contracting for major procurement projects has been seen mainly as a juridical, 
financial and managerial issue. Economic insight has not been applied to greater extent. Whereas 
economics as a science tends towards theoretical simplifications, the Fennovoima procurement 
project involves major complexities and uncertainties. In this thesis, these simplifications are used 
as a tool to dissect the complex procurement problem and to provide practical insight into 
overcoming some of the related risks. These risks have been gathered under the topics of bidding, 
contracting, holdup situations and renegotiation. Each chapter is started with the description of a 
relevant model.  
Even though contract theory falls short of providing precise recommendations for the formulation 
of a complex long-term contract, it does provide insight into a variety of features that should be 
accounted for, and optimal solutions, if these features would not appear simultaneously in a 
complex interplay. The contracting guidelines presented in this chapter are based on this insight. 
The first section of this chapter presents a research summary to remind the reader about the 
objectives and methods of this study. The second section concludes the managerial implications of 
the theoretical findings phase by phase. The bidding phase focuses on mitigating adverse selection 
through the supplier selection mechanism. As for contracting phase, the focus lies on the risk-
sharing and on mitigating moral hazard through ex-ante and ex-post incentives. Holdups and 
renegotiation phase, in turn, are best governed through ex-post incentives. The chapter is summed 
up in the third section by a discussion on the limitations of the study and a presentation of potential 
topics for further research. 
7.1  Research summary 
The aim of the thesis was to provide insight into procurement contracting with asymmetric 
information. The procurement process was divided into four subsequent phases – bidding, 
contracting, holdups and renegotiation. Each of these phases was characterized by a simple model 
and the main threats for each phased were recognized. The literature was used to provide practical 
insight into the mitigation of these threats. As an outcome, recommendations for the organization of 
a contracting process are presented in section 7.2  
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Procurement contracting has been subject to rather little research. However, the recent shortcomings 
of contractual arrangements in the context of nuclear power plant industry have created demand for 
economic insight about long-term procurement contracts. Furthermore, the one-shot nature of the 
Fennovoima project does not allow for repeating the mistakes made in previous projects. In a wider 
context, studying procurement contracting is important not only for industry purposes but also for 
pointing out gaps in the previous research. When dynamics are introduced into contract theory, 
there is still little consensus about both what the main issues are and of their formulation. 
7.2  Findings and managerial implications 
The figure below (Figure 5: Solutions to contractual issues) presents the findings with regards to the 
theoretical framework presented in section 1.2 Adverse selection, taking place in the bidding phase, 
is theoretically best mitigated through screening or signaling. Moreover, the use of these tools is 
enabled by sufficient competition. Moral hazard, in turn, is best mitigated through an appropriate 
risk-sharing structure or ex-post incentives. The bidding and contracting phases form the static part 
of the theory, and the theory offers tools for achieving an ex-ante efficient outcome. However, 
introducing dynamics into the setting gives rise to holdups and renegotiation. Theoretically, the 
same solutions (risk sharing, ex-post incentives) can be used to achieve an ex-post efficient 
outcome.  
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In the bidding phase, Fennovoima is negotiating in parallel with two potential suppliers. The main 
concern of the company is to select a supplier who is capable of delivering a licensable product: if 
both suppliers are capable, then the task boils down to selecting the one who performs at a lower 
cost. Ideally, both bidders would qualify so that competition between the bidders could be 
maintained until final closure.  
Two features stand out when the competing bidders are assessed against the literature. First, the 
French Areva has lately been involved in two largely overdue nuclear reactor projects, and has 
entered in a costly litigation process with another Finnish power company. This can be interpreted 
as a sign of the supplier’s type. Second, the Japanese supplier candidate Toshiba is likely to hold 
inferior information about the country-specific circumstances, which can both enhance the 
negotiation position of Fennovoima vis-à-vis Toshiba or induce a higher bid due to greater 
uncertainty faced by the supplier. 
Whereas the precontractual phase is commonly characterized by private information about the 
supplier’s type leading to adverse selection, it may not the case in nuclear industry. Instead, adverse 
selection can be induced by the bidder's impropriety for the particular project and not necessarily a 
sign of inaptitude or unwillingness to perform. Theoretically, adverse selection can be mitigated in 
two ways. The first solution is signaling. In a signaling model, the supplier holds superior 
information about his type. The second solution, screening, is conducted by the uninformed buyer. 
Screening is executed through a menu of contracts, from which the informed supplier chooses the 
one that yields the best payoff, considering his ability. The supplier’s type is revealed through his 
selection of compensation scheme, and the informational asymmetry no longer exists. Signaling is 
of little significance in the setting of this thesis, since the uncertainty about the contingencies and 
the functionality of the design is likely to be bilateral: the supplier is as ignorant about the future 
outcome as the buyer is. Screening, instead, can in practice be executed through the selection of a 
suitable bidding mechanism. 
Theoretically, a scoring auction between multiple supplier candidates allows for a close-to-optimal 
solution. However, the market features and the industry practices render an extensive auction 
impossible. Due to the thinness of the market and the high cost of negotiations, the number of 
potential suppliers has been limited to two in an early stage. Furthermore, the complexity of the 
product design deters the buyer from arranging a perfect scoring auction, accounting for all the 
required features and also the related risk-sharing structure in case of later modifications. Sequential 
bargaining, instead, allows for greater flexibility in terms of joint design development and bilateral 
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reputation building. This phase is especially crucial for Fennovoima to establish a reputation as a 
credible buyer with full capability to execute and complete the project, since there exists no 
previous track record about the company. 
To sum up, it is optimal for the buyer to weight the costs of double negotiations against the possible 
cost-savings from enhanced competition between the two suppliers – this should in part determine 
the duration of the parallel negotiations. Moreover, if the two supplier candidates seem to be 
equally qualified, it might be optimal to opt for the over which Fennovoima has an informational 
advantage. 
7.2.2  Arrangements for contracting 
In the contracting phase, Fennovoima’s main concern is to induce the supplier to provide a 
sufficient level of quality at the lowest possible cost. Here it is important to notice, that the plant 
cannot be licensed if the basic product requirements are not fulfilled. Providing an insufficient level 
of quality is hence equal to non-delivery. Therefore quality, interpreted as the product features, is an 
exogenous factor. In contrast, quality in the context of this procurement project, should be 
interpreted as the timeliness of the delivery: the faster the delivery of the licensable plant, the higher 
the buyer’s valuation.  
The long delays in the current nuclear power plant projects require careful consideration – the 
selected supplier must be both capable and willing of timely delivery. Once the more suitable 
supplier has been selected, the contract must be structured so as to induce the supplier to exert 
optimal effort, i.e. the marginal cost of effort must equal the marginal benefit from effort. 
Theoretically, monitoring enables compensating the supplier for his effort. However, this 
compensation can only be determined once the project is completed and the payoff is known to the 
buyer. If performance-related incentives are sufficient, i.e. the supplier agrees to being compensated 
according to his observed effort level once the project is complete, the informational asymmetry is 
eliminated and no further compensation scheme need to be considered. However, the supplier is 
likely to require compensation for the risk he bears already during the project execution. Therefore 
the contracting parties must agree on an ex-ante compensation scheme, which includes a definition 
of the risk-sharing structure. 
The risk-sharing literature examines a variety of features affecting the optimal choice. Table 1 sums 
up these features. As can be seen, the characteristics of the Fennovoima project involve an 
ambiguous effect on the optimal risk-sharing structure. First, if the supplier’s reputation is good, or 
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probability of repeated contracting is high, then a cost-plus contract would allow for greater 
flexibility and thus better quality. Moreover, the high complexity of the project and the high 
probability of changes in the design render renegotiation highly likely, which in turn make a cost-
plus contract more desirable. However, cost reductions are best achieved through a fixed-price 
contract, whereas quality can be more easily mandated through a cost-plus contract. It might 
therefore be optimal for the supplier to divide the procurement contract into more refined 
subprojects, each of which can then be separately contracted. 
Table 1: Considerations for risk-sharing 
 Fixed Price Cost Plus 
Reputation   
Chance of repeated contracting   
Project complexity   
Likelihood of changes in design   
Importance of cost reductions   
Importance of high quality   
 
Whereas the supplier’s ex-ante incentives can be defined through the risk-sharing structure, the ex-
post incentives require further consideration. To fully align the incentives of the contracting parties, 
the supplier’s payoff must be contingent on the buyer’s payoff. Therefore the optimal contract 
includes ex-post incentives, which ensure that the low cost and timely delivery are in the best 
interest of the supplier, regardless the risk-sharing structure defined in the initial contract. 
To sum up, it is optimal for Fennovoima as the buyer to consider both ex-ante and ex-post 
incentives. Ex-ante incentives are given significant weight due to the long duration and the high 
riskiness of the project. Ex-post incentives, in turn, contribute to aligning the goals of the 
contracting parties beyond covering the related risks. These incentives involve sharing ex-post 
surplus, i.e. a part of the buyer’s payoff to be traded for the supplier’s enhanced effort.  
7.2.3  Holdups  
Holdups and underinvestment are a relevant threat since the Fennovoima project requires project-
specific investments from the contracting parties. With regards to holdups, Fennovoima’s main 
concern is to incentivize an optimal investment level, i.e. equate the marginal cost of total 
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investment with its marginal benefit. Holdups occur when the investing party is unlikely to receive 
full compensation for its investment. In the Fennovoima project a holdup can occur if the supplier 
sees that a significant proportion of the increase in the value of the project, induced by his 
additional investment, would accrue to Fennovoima, and that his additional compensation does not 
cover the additional expenses.  
Whereas competition mitigates opportunism is the bidding phase, fair division of ex-post surplus 
mitigates opportunism in the contracting phase. Contractually, the parties need to ensure that a 
sufficient proportion of the additional payoff is given to the supplier so as to fully compensate for 
his investment.  
Different forms of option contracts are considered as a theoretical solution to the underinvestment 
problem. However, a sequential ownership option, where the supplier would sell the project to 
Fennovoima. once the investments are made, is out of question due to the industry regulation. 
Another way of utilizing an option contract would be to give the supplier a buy option on a share of 
the utility once the project is completed. This scheme involves risk-sharing considerations with 
regards industry risks and e.g. electricity market, and merits further study on its own. 
To sum up, holdup situation are best mitigated through adequate ex-post incentives, which 
coincides with the general findings about the contracting phase. When designing the incentive 
structure, the contracting parties must ensure that both parties are sufficiently compensated for their 
additional investments. In practice, the strongest ex-post incentives take the form of a joint venture. 
Weaker forms of ex-post incentives, in contrast, can be induced through schedule-related division 
of ex-post surplus. For instance, conditioning a part of the supplier’s compensation on the ex-post 
surplus generated within the target schedule would greatly contribute to the elimination of schedule-
related risks.  
7.2.4  Renegotiation 
Due to the project complexity, Fennovoima is highly likely to enter into renegotiation with the 
selected supplier at some point of the project. The long duration of the project, volatility of the 
regulatory environment and potential incompleteness of the design all contribute to a high 
probability of renegotiations. The initial contracting principles apply at this stage, as well: both ex-
ante and ex-post incentives need to be accounted for. The later in the project renegotiation takes 
place, the more weight can be allotted to the ex-post incentives. This means that as the project nears 
completion, the risk-sharing structure of the contract loses relevance, and a better outcome can be 
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attained by focusing on the ex-post division of surplus. Moreover, closer the project is to 
completion, the more complete the renegotiated contract is likely to be. Consequently, 
renegotiations are most probable to take place in the earlier stages of the project.  
If renegotiations are foreseen to incur high costs, it is recommendable to use a cost-plus contract. 
The buyer needs to consider whether the cost of renegotiation would exceed to cost increase due to 
the weaker cost reduction incentives a cost-plus contract offers. If, instead, a flexible renegotiation 
mechanism can be agreed upon in the initial contract and the contracting parties can commit not to 
deviate from it, a fixed-price contract can outperform the cost-plus form.  
To sum up, renegotiations can be seen as a normal phase of a long-term procurement project. In 
case the supplier’s reputation is low, which can be signaled by e.g. a high number of past lawsuits 
and litigation processes, the renegotiation can be anticipated to incur high costs. In this case, it 
might be worthwhile for Fennovoima to invest in a more complete contract so as to minimize the 
likelihood or renegotiations. If, however, the contract is written so as to leave room for 
renegotiations, i.e. it is left incomplete, it is advisable to include a renegotiation mechanism in the 
original contract design, and to apply the same incentive principles that in the contracting phase.  
7.3  Limitations of the study and topics for further research 
The extent of the Fennovoima project sets a limitation to the depth of the analysis of this thesis. 
Rather than giving exact guidelines, this thesis aims at pointing out considerations that need to be 
accounted for in different phases of the procurement project. This is due to the fact that despite the 
extensive research on asymmetric information, there exists little literature about long-term 
procurement projects. As the purpose of this thesis was to give an overview on contract theory in 
procurement contracting, the four topics (bidding, contracting, holdups and renegotiation) have each 
received only relatively little attention. In particular, the theory on dynamic long-term contracts has 
not yet been canonized, and the presentation varies greatly between articles.   
The imbalance between the main topics of this thesis is acknowledged. The risk-sharing rate has 
been analyzed in detail; however, research on the option contracts and the division of ex-post 
surplus is scarce. An optimal solution for a static contract can be achieved through careful 
mechanism design. However, as soon as the setting turns into a dynamic one, i.e. uncertainty, 
contractual incompleteness and therefore need for renegotiation is introduced into the scheme, the 
optimal allocating is no longer necessarily attainable through a simple contract. The challenges of 
defining an optimal contract for a complex dynamic setting also stem from the scarcity of the 
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literature. Whereas static contracts and the related theory are well established, the literature about 
the dynamic setting is still to boom. Perhaps the need for theory is also growing stronger, as the 
complexity of contracting environment increases. The globalized markets, accelerating pace of 
R&D and evolving information technology, for instance, support the need for further research about 
complex dynamic contracts. It is no longer customary to automatically rely on repeated contracting 
in extensive projects – the trading culture has evolved towards global competition, instead of local 
good-will based stable networks.  
This imbalance indicates an opening for further research: the ex-post incentives in the context of 
long-term contracting cannot be duly addressed in this thesis and deserve further attention. 
Combining these two topics – examining the optimal ex-post risk-sharing rate – would offer 
valuable insight into the formulation of an incentive-aligning long-term contract. 
Another source of imbalance in the thesis stems from the lack of canonical understanding on the 
dynamic contracting setting. Whereas there exists a consensus on the presentation of the stable 
models, the relative youth of the theory on dynamic contracting challenges the elegant presentation 
of the holdup problem as well as formulating the renegotiation. Quite clearly, this shortcoming 
resonates with the lack of research on long-term contracts, and will hopefully be shortly addressed. 
A cautionary word about the practical implications was given in section 7.2 . The theoretical 
overview on contracting is based on simplifying models, and reducing an extremely complex 
procurement situation into a descriptive study will fall short of providing a perfect framework for a 
real life procurement project. Therefore the findings of this thesis tend to be suggestive rather than 
positivistic. 
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